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The key uncertainty within the Strategic Defense
Initiative is not whether a multitiered ballistic missile
defense can be designed and implemented but rather in the
possibility that the intercept system can be readily count-
ered. Additionally, the viability of SDI is dependent upon
its cost effectiveness; a defense should not be considered
if it can be overcome at a significantly lesser cost.
To quantify these uncertainties, the Strategic Defense
Initiative is overviewed at a macro level. Potential coun-
termeasures to proposed defensive technologies are defined
and analyzed as to their feasibility and the possible
leverage, both in cost and in further uncertainty, that the
use of the countermeasure would provide. The study also
addresses possible counter-countermeasures, where appli-
cable. The results of the study can be used to provide input
parameters to systems simulations and system analyses of SDI
architectures and as an indicator of further study areas.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ..... 7
II. THE GOALS OF SDI 8
A. PERFECT DEFENSE ........ 8
B. LESS-THAN-PERFECT DEFENSE .......... 9
1. Enhance Deterrence 9
2. Assure Retaliatory Capability 9
3. Save Lives 10
4. Slow the Pace of Conflict 11
5. Prevent Accidents and Small Strikes ... 11
C. OTHER GOALS .11
1. Provide the U. S. with a First Strike
Capability 12
2. Respond to Soviet BMD Efforts 12
3. Shape the Course of Arms Control 13
4. Alter Economic States 13
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 13
III. DEFINING THE THREAT .......... 15
A. CURRENT THREAT .......... 15
B. FUTURE THREAT 16
C. THREAT PROFILES 21
1. Ballistic Missiles 21
2. Cruise Missiles 24
IV. SDI TECHNOLOGIES 25
A. MULTITIERED BMD 25
B. WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES 28
1. High Energy Lasers . 30
2. Particle Beam Weapons . 36
3. Kinetic Energy Weapons . 40
4. Emerging Technologies 43
C. WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES 44
1. Boost Phase On-orbit Satellites 44
2. A Model for Determining the Required
Number of Weapons Platforms 47
3. Other Satellite Deployment Options .... 58
4. Post-Boost / Midcourse Strategies .... 61
5. Terminal Defense 61
V. HOW MUCH WILL IT COST ? 70
VI. BMD COUNTERMEASURES 74
A. PREEMPTIVE ATTACK 76
1. Offensive ASAT Options 78
2. Satellite Defense Options 80
B. OFFENSIVE PROLIFERATION 85
C. DEFENSE DEGRADATION 90
1. Changes in Launch Strategy 91
2. Changes in Boost and Post-Boost Phase
Tactics and Technology 93
3. Changes in Midcourse and Terminal
Phase Tactics and Technology 98
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 101
LIST OF REFERENCES 104
BIBLIOGRAPHY 106
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 107
LIST OF TABLES
I EFFECTS OF A SINGLE 0. 5-MT WEAPON
(AIRBURST) ON THE TEN LARGEST U.S. URBAN AREAS . . 10
II SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILE LEVELS 17
III SOVIET STRATEGIC LAUNCH PLATFORMS 18
IV MX BOOST PHASE CHARACTERISTICS 22
V DOD BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM FUNDING . . 71
I. INTRODUCTION
In his historic speech of March 23, 1983, President
Ronald Reagan tasked the scientific community of the United
States to utilize its talent in research towards rendering
nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete. " This effort, known
as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), has been much
discussed in open literature by both scientists and politi-
cians alike. As a result of these interchanges, numerous
questions and doubts have arisen as to the goals and feasi-
bility of strategic defense.
A major element of the discussions has been the concept
of a layered space-based defense against ballistic missiles.
The key uncertainty within the Strategic Defense Initiative
is not whether such a multitiered ballistic missile defense
(BMD) can be designed and implemented but rather the possi-
bility that the intercept system could be readily countered.
Additionally, the viability of SDI is dependent upon its
cost effectiveness; a defense should not be considered if it
can be overcome at a significantly lesser cost. To quantify
these uncertainties, possible countermeasures to currently
proposed SDI technologies and architectures will be defined.
These countermeasures will be analyzed at a macro level as
to their feasibility and the leverage, both in cost and
further uncertainty, that they would provide.
This report is a compilation of analyses, drawn from
open literature, of the potential technologies and architec-
tures of SDI and of the resulting potential countermeasures.
It will provide the decision maker with a system level
understanding of the major issues of SDI and provide a basis
for comparing the different technologies. The results of the
study could be used to provide input parameters to system
simulations and system analyses of SDI architectures and as
an indicator of further study areas.
II. THE GOALS OF SDI
An intense dialog as to the ultimate goal of SDI was the
immediate response to President Reagan' s "Star Wars" speech.
Many of the arguments were the same as those which arose
during the debates of the late 1960's and early 1970 's on
the Sentinel and Safeguard Antiballistic Missile (ABM)
systems which resulted in the 1972 ABM Treaty. An under-
standing of the possible goals of SDI is required in order
to evaluate the effectiveness of the various proposed
architectures.
A. PERFECT DEFENSE
The purpose of the Strategic Defense Initiative, as
stated by President Reagan within his "Star Wars" speech, is
to start a "comprehensive and intensive effort to define a
long term research and development program to achieve our
ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic
nuclear missiles." [ Ref . 1: p. 86] The many critics of SDI
read this statement to mean that the administration is advo-
cating the development of a thoroughly reliable, 100% effec-
tive, perfect defense of both civilian population and
military assets against all nuclear weapons. This effort
would change the United States' strategic policy from one of
mutual assured destruction to one of assured survival.
However, within the National Security Decision Directive
imp] ementing the program, the President clarified that his
desire was "to decrease our reliance upon the threat of
retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons and to increase the
contribution of defensive systems to our security and the
security of our allies." [Ref. 2] Further, at a recent
conference on space and national security, Lieutenant
General James Abrahamson, the director of the SDI program,
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acknowledged that "there is no perfect weapons system, there
is no panacea," and Dr. Gerald Yonas, the program's chief
scientific advisor, said that the program's only purpose is
to "search for technology to see if we can find an alterna-
tive to the present system." [ Ref . 3]
B. LESS-THAN-PERFECT DEFENSE
Given that a perfect defense is unattainable, a number
of other defensive goals become plausible.
1. Enhance Deterrence
A limited defensive capability would enhance deter-
rence against nuclear war in essentially three ways.
Primarily, as an indeterminable number of offensive missiles
could no longer reach their designated targets, Soviet mili-
tary planners would face increasing uncertainty and diffi-
culty in planning a successful attack. Second, even a
moderately effective defense would force an opponent to
expend a larger number of offensive weapons than currently
required to achieve the same result. Finally, some high
value targets, such as intercontinental ballistic missile
( ICBM) silos, may become invulnerable to a preemptive first
strike. Therefore, for all these reasons, the military
utility of such a strike would be degraded.
2. Assure Retaliatory Capability
An effective preferential defense of the United
States' MX and Minuteman ICBM silos and command centers
would provide the U. S. with an assured retaliatory capa-
bility. How and when such a capability would be used is a
complex political problem. However, if this is to be consid-
ered a valid goal of SDI, the feasibility studies conducted
prior to 1972 for the Sentinel/Safeguard ABM systems should
be seriously reconsidered. An ABM defense designed to
protect only missile silos and command centers could
possibly be done at the terminal end alone and therefore a
space based system may not be cost effective. Terminal
defense methods such as dispersal, silo hardening, mobility,
and preferential defense strategies have also been suggested
to keep the retaliatory missiles invulnerable.
TABLE I
EFFECTS OF A SINGLE 0. 5-MT WEAPON (AIRBURST)
ON THE TEN LARGEST U. S. URBAN AREAS
Population
Metropolitan in 1970 Fatalities Casualties











Total 53.7 5.3 13.2
NOTES:
a. Source: U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, U. S. Urban Population Vulnerability ,
(GPO, i979y.
b. Assumptions: attack is designed to maximize
human fatalities; fatalities are prompt only,
using usual overpressure-casualty relationships;
residents are in their homes at the time of
attack.
c. The effects of a multi-weapon airburst would
be initially synergistic.
16. 3 1.2 3. 3
8. 7 0. 4 1. 1
6. 7 0. 9 1. 9
4. 6 0. 4 1. 4
3. 9 0. 5 1. 3
3. 6 0. 5 0. 8
2. 9 0. 5 1. 1
2. 6 0. 4 1. 1
2. 3 0. 3 0. 7
2. 1 0. 2 0. 5
3. Save Lives
"Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge
them ?" This noble thought, quoted from President Reagan's
"Star Wars" speech, has set the tone for the continuing
debates over SDI. Some critics of the program argue that to
attempt to replace the current strategic deterrence posture
with defense is sheer folly. They argue that, even if the
U. S. technology base were able to develop a defensive system
that was 95% effective, this very accomplishment would force
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the Soviet Union to change its offensive strategy from an
attack on military targets to a concentrated attack on popu-
lation centers in the hope of forcing the U. S. government to
capitulate without a retaliatory effort. The resulting popu-
lation damage would be catastrophic, as shown in Table I .
However, as General Daniel 0. Graham, USA (Ret), has stated,
"It is a strange moral and political logic that argues that
because we cannot save everyone we should abandon all
efforts to save anyone." [ Ref . 4] Again, this is a polit-
ical problem which is nonquantifiable to the decision maker
yet must be considered as a goal of SDI.
4. Slow the Pace of Conflict
An effective defense against ICBMs may pressure the
Soviet Union to shift the makeup of their offensive forces
towards submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), cruise
missiles, and bomber aircraft. U. S. military planners would
rather confront these slower flying weapons, which allow
more time for response, than confront the fast flying ICBMs.
Additionally, the slow flying cruise missiles and bombers
would be arguably easier to shoot down than an ICBM.
5. Prevent Accidents and Small Strikes
A defense designed to counter a full scale Soviet
offensive would also be effective in preventing smaller
nuclear exchanges. These exchanges could be classified into
three general groups :
• accidental nuclear missile launches,
• attacks by smaller nuclear powers,
• limited, high confidence, bargaining strikes during
crises.
C. OTHER GOALS
Some skeptics have suggested that the current military
and civilian administrations had ulterior goals other than
defense in putting forth the Strategic Defense Initiative.
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1. Provide the U.S. with a First Strike Capability
a. SDI as an Offensive Weapon
Should the technologies proposed for strategic
defense mature into realistic systems, it would be an easy
step to move from strategic defense to strategic offense.
The system which is capable of intercepting ICBMs shortly
after takeoff may also be capable of destroying targets on
the ground. Additionally, there exists a close similarity
in the technologies proposed for ballistic missile defense
and those proposed as anti-satellite (ASAT) devices. An
attack against Soviet military satellites would be a logical
precursor to a U. S. first strike.
b. SDI as a Shield from Retaliation
A modest, imperfect defense may be better
utilized as an adjunct to an attacking force than as a
defense against attack. While not capable of providing a
defensive shield against an all out Soviet offensive, a
modest defense could be capable of protecting the U. S.
against a ragged retaliatory effort by the Soviets after a
U. S. first strike.
2. Respond to Soviet BMP Efforts
U. S. military leaders have often declared that the
Soviet Union has continued with its own BMD efforts despite
the ABM Treaty and SALT agreements. The most recent poten-
tial violation is a phased array radar currently under
construction at Krasnoyarsk within the Soviet Union.
Military sources also state that the USSR is upgrading the
ABM system protecting Moscow with new missile, detection,
and tracking systems. These developments indicate that the
Soviets are maintaining active research in BMD technology.
Should the U. S. not implement its own research effort, she
may find herself unable to compete with the Soviets during
future periods of conflict.
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3. Shape the Course of Arms Control
The mere idea of a defensive posture by the United
States has brought the Soviets back to the arms control
table after years of stonewalling. Also, the SDI program has
provided the U. S. with great bargaining power, as evidenced
by the Soviet response during the recent arms control talks.
If the ongoing research studies prove SDI to be a feasible
project, the U.S. may gain a degree of strategic leverage
that she has not had since the advent of nuclear weapons.
This leverage would allow the U. S. to direct future arms
competition and arms control to her own ends.
4. Alter Economic States
Some Soviet officials suspect that by instituting a
highly sophisticated and expensive defense program,
Washington hopes to force Moscow into an arms race which
will severely tax their resources and technological capabil-
ities. This action in itself may add to nuclear deterrence.
If the current research shows SDI to be feasible, the
Soviets may find that the increased level of offensive weap-
onry needed to wage a successful first strike is unreason-
able on economic terms.
Another area of impact by SDI would be the American
economy. The massive amount of funding that the implementa-
tion of SDI is expected to require would provide benefits in
terms of employment, large investments, expanded use of
technology, etc. Additionally, one must consider the
possible long run savings the U. S. would experience by stem-
ming the currently unbridled arms race.
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
The measures of effectiveness (MOEs) of a program like
SDI are dependent upon the program' s specific goals.
Examples of possible MOEs are :
• the number of American lives saved by the system,
• the number of retaliatory missiles available to the
U.S. after a Soviet first strike,
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• the leakage allowed by the system,
• the period of time without a nuclear interchange
between superpowers.
Numerous other, more definitive measures could easily be
determined. However, which of these MOEs are pertinent is a
political decision which will not be addressed within this
study.
A significant problem in determining the effectiveness
of a defensive system lies behind the fact that such a
system can never be fully tested. In the face of a total
Soviet offensive, the system would be expected to respond
immediately and flawlessly. Therefore, regardless of the
goal, considerable uncertainty will always remain as to the
system's effectiveness.
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III. DEFINING THE THREAT
Primary in the design of a defensive military system is
the definition of the threat to be countered. The scope of
the threat is driven by the goals of the system and vice
versa. If the goal of SDI is strictly to provide an effec-
tive strategic defense, then only those weapons and weapons
platforms capable of delivering a long range strategic
nuclear strike should be considered.
These weapons and platforms will be quantified at
current levels; however, the decision maker must realize
that it is not current levels but future and potential
levels against which the effectiveness of any proposed
defensive architecture must be judged. Additionally, the
threat posed by strategic nuclear weapons, particularly by
ballistic missiles, depends upon the method by which the
weapons are deployed and utilized. Perhaps the most perti-
nent criteria for the decision maker is that the defensive
system must be designed to operate effectively under full
stress--that is, to effectively perform when faced with a
simultaneous launch of all available offensive assets while
these assets are employed in a manner which is advantageous
to the opponent.
A. CURRENT THREAT
While a growing number of nations are capable of
launching strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union poses
the most significant threat to the United States. The Soviet
Union is capable of placing strategic nuclear weapons upon
U. S. soil via intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine
launched ballistic missiles, long range strike aircraft, and
long range cruise missiles. If the goal of providing an
effective defense includes defending the assets of the U. S.
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and its allies within Europe, then the Soviet intermediate
range ballistic missiles ( IRBM) must also be taken into
account.
The following tables show current Soviet strategic force
levels as recently reported by the Department of Defense.
Table II provides strategic missile levels with the corre-
sponding number of warheads. Equally as important as the
number of missiles is the number of platforms from which the
weapons can be launched. Table III provides this informa-
tion. Knowledge of the number, disposition, and location of
the weapons platforms is essential to an effective defense.
The numbers and locations of hardened ICBM silos and opera-
tional bomber squadrons is readily determined and verified
prior to launch via intelligence methods. However, trends in
current Soviet modernization and expansion show a shift from
this state towards mobile ICBM launch platforms and bomber
aircraft using stealth techniques which will obviously be
harder to plan and design against. The more difficult
problem is determining the status of submarine strategic
launch platforms. As the Soviet Union continues to upgrade
the capabilities of its SLBMs, increase the number of its
submarine launch platforms, and exercise long term opera-
tional deployment schedules, the threat posed by the Soviet
submarine fleet may become the driving factor of any defen-
sive architecture.
B. FUTURE THREAT
In consideration of the long developmental period
required by any new weapons system, the designers and deci-
sion makers of SDI need to look far into the future when
attempting to assess the threat which will be faced. While
trying to look this far ahead is difficult, one can look at
the Soviet strategic developments of the recent past and the
near future to attempt to extrapolate into the outyears. A



































































a. Source: Department of Defense, Soviet Military
Power 1985 . (GPO, 1985).
b. The number of long range cruise missiles is
unavailable due classification limitations.
will at least continue at present pace and probably increase
in order to undermine U. S. efforts to transition to a defen-
sive posture.
Since the SALT I Interim Agreement of Offensive Arms of
1972, the Soviet Union has increased its offensive forces
both quantitatively and qualitatively to the fullest extent
possible within the constraints of that agreement and the
follow-on SALT II Agreement. U.S. military officials have
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TABLE III
SOVIET STRATEGIC LAUNCH PLATFORMS
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also been given reason to believe that in some areas the
Soviet Union may have violated the tenets of those agree-
ments. Since 1971, Soviet strategic offensive forces intro-
duced include :
• four new types of ICBMs
• five new types of ballistic missile submarines
• four new types of SLBMs
18
• five improved versions of existing SLBMs
• long range cruise missiles
• long range bomber aircraft capable of firing air-
launched cruise missiles
Numerically, during this period the Soviet Union
deployed 62 new ballistic missile submarines, virtually all
its current ballistic missile submarine fleet. The Soviets
also introduced their entire complement of multiple, inde-
pendently targeted warhead ICBMs, including the SS-17,
SS-18, and SS-19. The liquid fueled SS-18 is the largest
missile currently deployed by any military power and is
capable of carrying ten warheads. The smaller SS-17 and
SS-19 carry four and six warheads, respectively. It is
interesting to note that deployment of these ICBMs began
merely seven years ago. In comparison, the most modern U. S.
missile, the Minuteman III, is capable of carrying only
three warheads. The U. S. is, however, developing a new
missile, the Peacekeeper/MX, which will be capable of
carrying ten warheads. None of these missiles are currently
deployed.
The Soviet Union also has a number of new systems under
development and nearing deployment. These systems include :
(1) New fourth and fifth generation ICBMs. The medium
sized SS-X-24 will be capable of carrying up to ten
warheads and the smaller SS-X-25 will carry one
warhead. These missiles show large advances in Soviet
technology in that both missiles will be solid
fueled. Additionally, a mobile version of each of
these systems will be deployed, thereby strengthening
the Soviet strategic posture. The SS-X-25, if
deployed, will violate the SALT II Agreement which
limited both sides to developing only one new type of
ICBM.
(2) A new generation SLBM. The SS-NX-23 is a large,
liquid propelled missile which will have greater
range, carry more warheads, and be more accurate than
the SS-N-18 currently carried aboard the Delta III
class submarine.
(3) A new class of nuclear powered ballistic missile
submarine. The Delta IV will carry sixteen SS-NX-23
ballistic missiles.
(4) A new long range bomber. The Blackjack has been esti-
mated to have an unrefueled combat radius of 7300
kilometers and a maximum speed of 1100 knots. The
aircraft will be capable of carrying cruise missiles,
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bombs, or a combination of both. The Blackjack will
be capable for use against the continental U. S. and
may be operational by 1988.
(5) Four new types of cruise missiles. Two of the
missiles are adaptations of the air launched AS-15
currently in the Soviet inventory. The SS-NX-21 will
be submarine based while the SSC-X-4 will be ground
based. Each of these carry a single warhead and have
a range of 3000 kilometers. The remaining two cruise
missiles under development are the submarine launched
SS-NX-24 and the ground launched GLCM. These missiles
are considerably larger than any previous cruise
missile and are estimated to be extremely accurate.
In addition to these new systems, the Soviets may also
choose to upgrade their current systems. For example, the
SS-18, while limited by SALT II to 10 warheads, may be
capable of carrying up to 30 warheads.
When considering future force levels, allowance can be
made for arms limitation agreements, those current and those
proposed for the future. Presently, the ABM Treaty of 1972,
the SALT I Agreement of 1972, and the SALT II Agreement of
1979 are all still in effect. In the recent arms limitation
talks in Geneva, other numerous limitation proposals were
offered by both sides. The latest U. S. proposal included a
ban on mobile land-based ICBMs and a limitation by both
sides to 6000 strategic warheads. Of these, 3000 could be on
ICBMs, 1500 on SLBMs, and the remaining 1500 on cruise
missiles.
Two major sticking points arose during the recent talks.
The Soviets wanted the Strategic Defense Initiative to be up
for negotiation, to which the United States objected. The
U. S. disagreed to the Soviet proposal for the definition of
strategic forces. The Soviets wished to include U. S.
Pershing II IRBMs and U.S. ground launched cruise missiles
deployed in Europe but not the Soviet SS-20 IRBMs. The
reasoning behind this proposal was that the U. S. missiles
could reach the Soviet Union but the Soviet missiles cannot




The flight characteristics of the various ICBM, SLBM,
IRBM, and cruise missiles provide the structure around which
a defense must be designed.
1. Ballistic Missiles
Ballistic missiles are characterized by the free
fall trajectory that they follow. Essentially, these
missiles rise above the atmosphere, reach a peak height
(apogee), and fall back to the earth, pulled by gravity. Via
this method, the missiles can rapidly travel over large
distances while their trajectory places them out of the
reach of current conventional defensive weapons.
The flight path of a ballistic missile can be broken
down into four major phases : boost, post-boost, midcourse,
and terminal. The weight and size of the missile, the number
of warheads carried, the class of propellant ( liquid or
solid fueled), and the type of launch platform determine the
length and character of each phase. Since the Soviets are
trending toward solid fueled, multiple warhead missiles
analogous to the developing Peacekeeper/MX, the threat
profile of the MX will be used for illustration.
The boost phase consists of the time period from
when the missile leaves the surface of the earth until the
last of its propellant is expended. The missile is initially
ejected from its silo by steam pressure. Once clear, a first
stage booster rocket ignites and propels the missile upward
along a preordained path until the rocket is spent and
detaches from the missile structure. Modern ballistic
missiles may have up to three such stages with the flight
path chosen to require minimum energy. The boost phase typi-
cally last several hundred seconds, during which the missile
accelerates to about 7 km/sec and reaches an altitude of
approximately 200 kilometers. Table IV shows the approximate
boosting stages of the MX ICBM. Of note, the last seconds of
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the third stage are extremely crucial in order to give the
missile enough impetus to reach its intended target.
TABLE IV
MX BOOST PHASE CHARACTERISTICS
Stage Elapsed Time Height
( sees) ( km)
Launch
First Stage 55 22
Second Stage 110 82
Third Stage 170-180 200
NOTES :
a. Source: Office of Technology Assessment,
Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space ,
April 1984.
b. All numbers are approximate.
Once the rocket boosting is completed, the remaining
missile structure (known as the "bus") begins to release a
number of warheads throughout the post-boost phase. Each
warhead is encased within a vehicle which is shaped and
hardened to withstand reentry into the atmosphere. The bus
is equipped with small rocket thrusters which allow it to
make relatively small course changes in order to release the
vehicles into extremely precise ballistic trajectories.
Along with the vehicles, the bus can also release a number
of decoys and other aids to confuse any defensive target
tracking. This type of system is called a multiple indepen-
dently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) system and enables
one offensive missile to engage several potential targets.
The post-boost phase lasts approximately 500 seconds until
the last warhead and decoys are released just prior to
apogee.
After all reentry vehicles (RVs) and penetration
aids (penaids) are released, the midcourse phase begins. By
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this time a defense is not threatened by a single missile
but rather by a dense threat cloud comprised of up to 10 RVs
and possibly over 100 penaids of various types and func-
tions. Throughout the midcourse, the RVs and penaids free
fall towards their designated targets after attaining an
apogee of approximately 1200 kilometers. The midcourse phase
lasts approximately 1000 seconds.
The final, or terminal, phase begins when the
reentry vehicles and penetration aids reach the upper limit
of the sensible atmosphere at approximately 100 kilometers.
Reentry into the atmosphere lasts from 30 to 100 seconds
depending upon the trajectory of the RV. During reentry, the
lighter, unhardened, ill-shaped penaids and missile debris
are stripped away from the threat cloud by atmospheric drag,
leaving only the warhead to be targeted by a defense. The
final event in a missile trajectory is the detonation of the
missile's warheads. The entire sequence of phases, from
launch to impact, occurs approximately over a mere 30
minutes.
The trajectory described above is based upon minimal
energy requirements since no defense is currently available
to interrupt the missile sequence. Should ballistic missile
defenses become operational, a number of options arise. At
the expense of more propellant and possibly fewer warheads,
the Soviets could place the missiles into depressed trajec-
tories, thereby shortening the amount of time available to a
space-based defense. As an alternative, the Soviets could
place the missiles into lofted trajectories resulting in a
shorter terminal phase. Conceivably, the Soviet Union would
use a variety of such trajectories when launching a first
strike in order to fully stress the defense.
There are no fundamental differences between ICBMs
and SLBMs or IRBMs. However, because of the lesser
geographic range required to travel, SLBMs and IRBMs travel
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along a much shorter, depressed trajectory thereby
decreasing the time between launch and impact and the
targeting accuracy available. The flight time of an SLBM
could be as short as 8 to 10 minutes as compared to 30
minutes for an ICBM. Additionally, the SLBMs own the impor-
tant element of surprise which further stresses any proposed
defense.
2. Cruise Missiles
Cruise missiles are, in effect, small unmanned
aircraft which are preprogrammed to fly along a specific,
low-level flight path to the designated target. The missiles
are capable of delivering nuclear warheads with great accu-
racy over a range of 3000+ kilometers; however, the time
from launch to impact is greater than that of ballistic
missiles. Soviet cruise missiles under development are
capable of being launched from air, land, sea, or subsurface
platforms. Due the simplicity of flying low over the unob-
structed ocean surface, the cruise missile is considered




The technologies and architectures proposed for
ballistic missile defense range from the simple to the
sophisticated and from the exotic to the elementary. While
a knowledge of these proposals is necessary to ascertain the
feasibility of the effort, the concepts currently under
investigation are so tentative and undefined that an attempt
to compare specifics would be premature. Therefore, this
section will merely familiarize the reader with the general
concepts which were the genesis of the Strategic Defense
Initiative.
A. MULT ITIERED BMD
Numerous studies and analyses have supported the conclu-
sion that an effective ballistic missile defense needs to be
multitiered. This defense-in-depth concept stems from the
consideration of several factors :
(1) A single line of defense must by necessity be highly
sophisticated to provide even a modest level of
effectiveness against the vast number of targets
which it will face in an all-out ballistic nuclear
war. Additionally, this single front would be vulner-
able to countermeasures specifically developed to
thwart its technology. In a multitiered system, the
technology used in each tier need not be as complex
in order to achieve the same level of effectiveness.
The vulnerability of the defense would also be
reduced. Each tier could be structured with a
different type of technology so that any single
method an attacker used to circumvent the defense
would not equally effect each tier of the engagement.
(2) Given that some leakage can be expected from any
single layer of defense, a multitiered defense can
add to the uncertainty faced by the Soviet military
planner. Leakage is defined as the percentage of
warheads which get through a layer intact and
operational. The Soviets could lessen the
effectiveness of a single line of defense through
sheer proliferation of missiles while still
maintaining a high probability of success. However,
with a multitiered BMD, the Soviet planners would
face increased uncertainty as to the number of
warheads that could reach their designated targets
and, therefore, would also be uncertain as to the
amount of retaliation they could expect.
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(3) A multitiered defense may be more cost effective than
a single front. A system of three defensive layers,
each allowing 10% leakage, is likely to be cheaper
than one layer of the same 99. 9% effectiveness.
The most attractive phase to defend against is the boost
phase. During this phase, the rising missile is easily
targeted due the highly specific infrared ( IR) signature
generated by the missile as it passes through the dense
atmosphere. Additionally, the booster rockets present
larger, more fragile targets than do the individual reentry
vehicles of later phases. Perhaps the most prevalent reason
for boost phase intercept is, however, the great numerical
leverage presented to the defense. For every missile killed
during the boost phase, the number of objects to be handled
by the remaining elements of a multitiered BMD is reduced by
a factor of 10 to 100 or more.
Defense in the post-boost phase is also highly attrac-
tive although the leverage to be gained in this phase
decreases rapidly with time. As the bus releases reentry
vehicles and penaids, its value as a target declines.
Consequently, early interception of the bus provides the
highest numerical leverage. Strategic leverage may also be
gained. By destroying the bus early, RVs not yet deployed
may still arrive over the U.S. (due their ballistic nature)
but not near their intended targets.
Further strategic leverage available from both boost and
post-boost defenses stems from the fact that interception
during either of these phases disrupts the highly structured
attack sequence required to optimally utilize ballistic
weapons. In summary, perhaps even a modest level of attri-
tion during the early phases of a Soviet ballistic missile
attack would be sufficient to destroy any confidence the
Soviet Union may have towards a successful first strike.
The major disadvantage to boost and post-boost defenses
is the short time available for interception. A midcourse
defense would not have this disadvantage. However, midcourse
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defense presents its own formidable problem—the large
volume of reentry vehicles, penetration aids, and missile
debris that must be acquired, tracked, and targeted within
the cold reaches of space. Also, throughout the entire post-
boost and midcourse phases, a search must illuminate the
threat cloud with radar or laser or search for a very weak
infrared signal in order to attempt to discriminate the
warheads from the decoys and debris. Without an efficient
discrimination, a defense would have to intercept each
element of the threat cloud to insure the warheads are
destroyed.
Defense in the terminal phase is also hampered by time
availability but not by the need for discrimination. Reentry
into the atmosphere filters out the lighter, unshaped decoys
and debris in the threat cloud leaving only the armed
reentry vehicles or highly sophisticated decoys which must
be assumed to be armed. Additionally, air friction heats the
falling RVs thereby providing a good IR signature for
targeting.
The very physical structure of the described multitiered
defense places a number of architectural and technological
requirements on the system designer in addition to those
obstacles placed by the actual weapons technologies. For
example, hundreds of booster rockets rising through the
atmosphere thousands of miles from U. S. territory may only
be attacked from space; therefore, satellite technology is
required for boost and post-boost defenses at the minimum.
Midcourse defense may possibly be conducted from the ground
or inside the atmosphere while terminal defenses, by defini-
tion, are endoatmospheric.
A multitiered BMD also requires an intricate battle
management system in order to efficiently allocate weapons
to targets throughout each phase of the attack. A primary
requirement of the system would be to conduct birth-to-death
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tracking of all objects posing a potential threat. The
system would have to discriminate RVs from penaids, pass
track and target information between defensive tiers, and
assign weapons to individual targets. In addition, the func-
tions of surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill
assessment ( SATKA) would have to be conducted within each
tier. The prodigious data handling problem thus posed by
multitiered BMD would require precise, high speed, large
volume computing technology that may possibly also be space
based.
The previous discussion should impress upon the reader
that, although a multitiered ballistic missile defense poses
numerous obstacles to the designer, this type of architec-
ture does have great potential for providing an effective
defense.
B. WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES
Major advances in weapon systems technologies have
occurred since ballistic missile defense was last seriously
discussed in th early 1970' s. The capability for satellite
basing and improvements in fast, high volume computing have
also become available. The potential of these new technolo-
gies to provide an effective defense resulted in the estab-
lishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
A driving factor in the feasibility of a BMD is the time
available for target engagement. This parameter is particu-
larly pertinent in the short boost and post-boost phases due
the high numerical leverage that is possible. Consideration
of this factor has directed systems designers towards high
speed interceptors that can be based and/or can engage
multiple targets in space. As a consequence, most of the
discussion and publicity surrounding SDI has addressed the
use of space-based directed energy weapons, such as lasers.
It was, in fact, the concept of using this type of weapon
which dubbed the program with its "Star Wars" nickname.
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Directed energy weapons (DEWs) appear to be highly
desirable over the previous kinetic energy weapons (KEWs)
for the following reasons :
• DEWs allow target engagements to be conducted at or
near the speed of light,
• DEWs provide a nonnuclear kill mechanism,
• DEWs allow for highly surgical engagements with minimal
collateral damage to nontargets,
• DEWs could provide a large (possibly unlimited)
multiple engagement capability, dependent on power
requi rement s
,
• DEWs have the potential for continuous worldwide threat
coverage while utilizing a small number of systems due
their long lethal range,
• DEWs have an inherent self defense capability.
Based on the above, the decision maker may conclude that
the research effort should focus only on this new type of
weapon. However, numerous tradeoffs exist which make kinetic
energy weapons still a valid alternative. As an example,
among the tradeoffs is the tracking and targeting criteria.
A DEW must actually strike the target in order to inflict
damage whereas an explosive KEW can be effective at a
considerable distance. Therefore, for a directed energy
weapon to destroy its target, the position of the target
must be known to within a distance equal to the target's
shortest dimension and the DEW must be pointed with the same
accuracy. This requirement poses a serious obstacle to the
use of directed energy weapons. Other tradeoffs include the
potential power requirements, the capability for endoatmos-
pheric intercept, the number of interceptors per satellite,
and the degree of battle management required.
This discussion should convince the reader that research
into all types of defensive weapons, architectures, and
strategies must be continued in order to assess all options.
For this reason, the technologies under serious study range
from kinetic energy weapons, such as the hypervelocity elec-
tromagnetic rail gun, to directed energy weapons, including
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lasers and particle beams. Additionally, other technologies
continue to emerge for consideration and prior defensive
weapons systems, originally designed only for terminal
defense, are being reevaluated. The reader will be intro-
duced to the newer technologies to assess their potential.
1. High Energy Lasers
The weapons technology currently receiving the most
attention is the high energy laser. The word "laser" is an
abbreviation of the term "light amplification by the stimu-
lated emission of radiation. " This concept involves using
some source of external energy to cause the oscillation of
atomic particles between energy states and thereby causing
the emission of radiation. The ultimate result of the action
is a stream of coherent electromagnetic waves--that is,
light waves all of which have the same frequency, phase, and
direction of motion. These waves are focused into a tight
beam of high intensity via precise optics. The lasers under
study for SDI include the chemical, excimer, free electron,
and Xray lasers.
a. Laser Kill Mechanisms
Lasers output energy in basically two modes,
continuous wave (CW) or pulsed. To kill a target, a laser
must deposit this energy onto the target's surface. The
proportion of laser energy that would be absorbed by a
target depends on the frequency of radiation, the material
hardness of the target, and the condition of the target's
surface.
A continuous wave laser causes physical damage
to a missile target by heating the outer surface of the
missile until the beam burns a hole through it. Due the
moderate intensities of CW lasers, this type of thermal kill
requires a relatively long time on target (dwell time),
probably on the order of seconds. The actual damage done
would depend on the type of target (RV, bus, or booster) and
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where the target was illuminated. Drilling a hole through
the fuel tank could cause venting and/or ignition of the
fuel leading to a loss of control in the boost phase. A
rupture on the surface of the missile in flight may cause
structural collapse. Disabling the fuse which triggers a
nuclear warhead would prevent the warhead from exploding or
possibly cause it to explode prematurely. Finally, knocking
the guidance controls could cause the warheads to impact far
from their designated targets.
A pulsed laser can also cause damage in a
variety of ways. Repetitive, moderate intensity, short
laser pulses could be aimed at the missile's electronic
guidance. The abrupt heating and cooling would cause thermal
shock, perhaps sufficient enough to shatter the glass and
ceramic semiconductors. Probably more effective would be a
single pulse of extreme intensity. The laser pulse would
instantaneously vaporize a thin layer of the target's skin,
generating a high impulse or shock wave that would travel
through the target possibly causing mechanical failure or
structural collapse. Using a single or even a small number
of high intensity pulses would alleviate the dwell time
problems posed by CW lasers,
b. Laser Propagation
Due their high speed of intercept, lasers can be
deployed a considerable distance from their targets;
however, this distance is not unlimited. The effective range
of a laser is constrained by the physical principles of
diffraction and attenuation.
While a laser can originally emit a perfectly
formed beam of energy, the wave nature of light guarantees
that the beam will eventually spread and become progres-
sively more diffuse, even in the vacuum of space. This
phenomena is known as diffraction. Diffraction limits the
size of the spot to which a laser beam can be focused. The
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diameter of the spot (d) grows in proportion to the wave-
length (w) and target range (r) and inversely proportional
to the size of the focusing mirror (D), in accordance with
equation 4. 1 :
d = 1.22 w r / D (meters) ( eqn 4.1)
As the spot size increases, the energy carried by the beam
is spread over a growing area and therefore the beam's
destruction potential decreases.
The quality of the optics is also a factor in
diffraction. Should the focusing mirror be imperfect, the
spot formed will be larger than the diffraction limit;
correspondingly, the energy deposited per unit area will be
reduced thus making the laser a less effective weapon.
Constructing a large perfect mirror presents a significant
obstacle to SDI. The size of the mirror required for a given
range and effectiveness depends on the wavelength of the
laser, as shown in equation 4. 1 . Shorter wavelengths
permit the use of smaller mirrors. A possible alternative to
a single large perfect mirror is the design of a large
optical surface comprised of a number of small perfect
mirrors combined so their positions are all aligned to
within a fraction of a wavelength. Of particular note in
the relationship between optics and wavelength is that, due
their extremely short wavelength, Xrays penetrate matter and
are absorbed. Therefore, Xrays cannot be back reflected by
any type of mirror and special targeting technologies must
be utilized.
Attenuation is the weakening of the intensity of
light through atmospheric absorption. The attenuation of a
laser beam in space is negligible; however, once atmosphere
is encountered, the strength of the beam decreases rapidly.
The attenuation that occurs to light energy is evidenced by
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the protection that the atmosphere provides us from the
harsh rays of the sun. This same shield may protect missiles
in the boost phase.
The amount of attenuation which occurs to a
laser beam is also dependent upon the wavelength of the
beam. In short, the longer the wavelength, the less the
attenuation--although gaps do exist throughout the spectrum
of light energy. Therefore, the altitude to which a laser
beam can penetrate the dense atmosphere varies with the type
of laser. Of those under study, chemical lasers have the
longest wavelength. Physicists theorize that this laser can
propagate down to approximately 100 km and still have suffi-
cient energy to injure a rocket booster. At the opposite
extreme, Xrays are strongly absorbed by even the thinnest
atmosphere and may therefore prove useless for endoatmos-
pheric intercept.
One concept in the use of laser technology for
strategic defense is to base the laser and its power supply
on the ground. The laser beam would be sent into space
where it would be refocused and targeted by an orbiting
mirror. This concept therefore requires the beam to also
pass through the dense inner atmosphere, thus compounding
the problems of beam propagation. The most dominant factor
in inner atmospheric interference is turbulence in the air.
Atmospheric turbulence distorts the wavefront of the beam
causing a loss in beam coherency. This phenomena is
evidenced by the twinkling of stars and distant lights.
The effect of turbulence can be compensated for
by a technique called adaptive optics. A primary laser beam
is sent through the atmosphere while sensors measure the
distortion caused to the beam. A second beam is then gener-
ated but altered to compensate for the distortion, thereby
maintaining coherency. Adaptive optics are currently limited
to atmosphere close to the laser source and therefore are
not considered as a viable aid to space-based lasers.
33
c. Laser Types
The laser type currently at the highest state of
maturity is the chemical laser. As implied by the name, this
laser derives its energy from a chemical reaction between
two chemicals at different energy states. The reaction may
occur naturally or may be triggered by a small electrical
discharge. The chemical combinations under most intense
investigation are hydrogen- fluoride (HF) and deuterium-
fluoride (DF). The tradeoff between these two combinations
includes both wavelength and cost. DF laser wavelengths are
longer than those produced by HF lasers and therefore travel
through atmosphere more efficiently. However, deuterium is
very rare and hence much more expensive as a lasing source.
Other promising chemical combinations include carbon-oxygen
and oxygen-iodine.
Most chemical laser research has produced
devices which yield a continuous wave beam. Since chemical
reactions are difficult to rapidly regulate, producing pulse
lasers with chemicals may prove infeasible. The major
advantage, from a military standpoint, of chemical lasers
over the previous crystalline and gas-dynamic lasers is the
capability for compact energy storage. Should the laser
system be based in space, chemical fuels can be stored more
efficiently over long periods of time than electrical power
supplies.
A promising technology for generating a tunable
continuous wave beam is the free electron laser. The basic
physics of a free electron laser is to utilize a particle
accelerator to bring a beam of electrons to a high velocity
and then pass the beam through a specially tailored magnetic
field. The magnetic field is formed by a linear array of
magnets, called a wiggler, that alternate in polarity so
that the electron beam is subjected to regular oscillations
in the magnetic field strength and direction. The
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oscillations of the beam cause the electrons to emit light
energy. Mirrors properly placed then focus the light energy
and create a laser beam. By adjusting the magnet spacing and
the energy level of the electrons entering the system, the
wavelength of the resulting beam can be tuned to allow
system designers to optimize on atmospheric propagation and
mirror sizing.
The excimer laser is a combination of the
concepts of chemical and free electron lasers. Its light
energy is the result of directing an electrical discharge or
beam of electrons into a gas combination containing
excimers. Excimer stands for "excited dimer", a molecule
consisting of a pair of atoms bound together only when the
molecule is in an excited state. When, as a result of elec-
tron bombardment, the molecule drops into a lower energy
state, the molecule disintegrates and produces light energy.
Excimer lasers can produce either continuous wave beams or
high power pulses at short ultraviolet wavelengths.
The most controversial proposal for laser beam
weaponry is the nuclear pumped Xray laser. Due the extremely
short wavelength provided, this weapon could only be
deployed in space and would be effective only after targets
cleared the atmosphere. The laser consists of a small
nuclear bomb at the core of bundles of fibers of lasant
material. Explosion of the nuclear bomb generates Xrays
which are captured by the bundled fibers and focused into a
laser beam before the bundles are destroyed by the resul-
tant nuclear blast.
The fact that an Xray laser inevitably self-
destructs imposes limits on the way it can be used. Because
Xrays travel at the speed of light while the resultant shock
wave travels more slowly, a short laser pulse can be gener-
ated before the fibers are destroyed; however, the bundles
of fibers would have to be perfectly targeted prior to
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triggering the nuclear bomb. No mirrors could be used to
retarget the pulse due its wavelength. On the positive side,
Xray lasers could provide an instantaneous multiple target
capability based on the number of fiber bundles deployed.
Further, each pulse generated would be of extremely high
intensity and no dwell time on target would be required.
Xray lasers also would utilize a power source that can
easily and efficiently be stored and generated.
2. Particle Beam Weapons
Perhaps the most exotic of the technologies proposed
for strategic defense is the particle beam, a military adap-
tation of cathode ray tube technology. A particle beam is a
stream of atomic or subatomic particles of like energy
states which is generated by a high voltage electric pulse
and accelerated by an electrical and/or magnetic field,
thereby increasing the kinetic energy of the particles.
Nature's analogy to the particle beam is a bolt of light-
ning. A particle beam weapon would collectively direct the
atomic particles towards a target and, if the particles hit,
could cause great and possibly instantaneous damage.
Particle beams interact with matter in a manner
totally different than that of laser beams. Each particle
that strikes the target with sufficient energy would pene-
trate the target and travel through it. As it penetrates,
each particle loses energy by transfering that energy to
electrons within the target via a series of inelastic colli-
sions. The amount of energy the particle deposits in the
target depends on the mass and energy of the particle, the
nature of the target, and the distance travelled in the
target. The penetration depth is inversely proportional to
the density of the absorbing target material.
Given enough particles impacting with the target in
a short time, the deposited energy could cause damage in a
variety of ways. The kinetic energy lost by the particles
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would eventually manifest itself as heat. Thermal kill could
occur by ignition of the rocket fuel, detonation of the high
explosive trigger of a nuclear warhead, structural collapse,
or melting internal electronic guidance or critical compo-
nents. Electronic "soft" kill may occur due the upset of
unshielded electronics by transient radiation effects
similar to those caused by nuclear explosions. Also, a
sudden influx of electrons might knock out a semiconductor
device's memory, rendering it either temporarily useless or
permanently disabled.
Particle beam weapons are similar to laser weapons
in that the destructive energy of a particle beam travels at
near the speed of light and that, to cause damage, the beam
must have a direct hit on target. Particle beams are also
subject to diffusion by the atmosphere. Particle beams are
classified as either charged or neutral.
Charged particles are those particles with either a
positive or negative electrical charge and consist of elec-
trons, protons, and positive or negative ions. Only
electrically charged particles can be accelerated and aimed
as a high energy beam; however, this type of beam poses
significant physical problems to the weapons designer. Each
particle in a beam of like charged particles is subject to
mutual Coulomb repulsion by all other particles and there-
fore rapid radial spreading of the beam would occur.
Similarly, the charged particles, actively interact with
atoms in the atmosphere thereby causing the beam to quickly
become more diffuse. The more serious obstacle, however, is
the divergence of a charged particle beam caused by the
earth's geomagnetic field. Charged particles are deflected
away from their original path by any magnetic field in an
amount inversely proportional to the momentum of the parti-
cles and directly proportional to the strength of the
magnetic field. Due the irregularities of the earth's
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geomagnetic field, a charged particle beam would bend in
complex and possibly unpredictable ways thus making the beam
difficult to aim. The uncertainty in the amount of deflec-
tion of a charged particle beam would be proportional to the
uncertainty of the strength of the geomagnetic field at any
point along the beam's path.
The problem of propagating a charged particle beam
through the atmosphere may possibly be solved by a technique
known as hole boring. A channel in the atmosphere would be
evacuated of charged particles via ionization thereby
allowing the beam to travel unhindered. The evacuated
channel, or hole, would be bored by either a high energy
laser or by pulsing the charged particle beam such that each
pulse bores a hole through which the next can travel. Via
this technique, it may be possible to propagate a charged
particle beam a few kilometers; however, the beam would
still be subject to geomagnetic deflection. In addition,
once the beam reaches the vacuum of space, it rapidly
disperses due mutual particle repulsion therefore limiting a
charged particle beam weapon to ground basing and endoatmos-
pheric intercept.
The requirement for exoatmospheric intercept drives
researchers to consider neutral particle beams. Since only
charged particles can be accelerated and aimed via electro-
magnetic fields, a neutral particle beam is generated by
first generating and aiming a charged particle beam and then
neutralizing the charge on this beam. The most advanced
neutral particle beam currently available is comprised of
neutral hydrogen (H°) atoms. A beam of negatively charged
hydrogen (H~) atoms is generated via a particle accelerator,
focused and steered via a system of magnetic lenses, and
then neutralized by passing the beam through a gas chamber
to strip off the extra electron thus forming a stream of
neutral (H°) particles. The electron stripping can also be
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accomplished by passing the beam through an externally
imposed magnetic field or through a laser beam. Once a
neutral particle beam hits a target, it converts back into a
charged particle beam with the resulting damage as previ-
ously discussed.
In the vacuum of space, high energy neutral particle
beams can travel great distances. Although the neutral
particles are subject to the earth's gravitational pull, the
beam travels at essentially the speed of light; therefore,
the effect of gravity is negligible and the beam travels in
a straight line. Once atmosphere is encountered, however,
these positive qualities are lost. A neutral particle beam
cannot propagate stably through even the thinnest atmos-
phere. The rapidly moving neutral atoms would collide with
air molecules and be converted into electrically charged
ions and particles which would be fanned out by the earth's
geomagnetic field. For this reason, physicists theorize that
neutral particle beams would be ineffective below approxi-
mately 160 km from the earth's surface.
Significant problems with both types of particle
beam weapons are targeting and kill assessment. It would be
difficult to ascertain the miss vector between a particle
beam and the target. Therefore, the defense may have to fire
blindly and repeatedly until the BMD target either explodes
or tumbles out of control. Target kill would not be so
readily apparent if caused by transient radiation.
Alternatively, the weapon could be preprogrammed to stochas-
tically fire a fixed number of particle pulses and then
shift to the next target without positive knowledge of a
kill. Another significant obstacle is space basing. The
immense power required to accelerate a particle beam may
possibly not be feasibly stored or generated in space.
Additionally, the magnetic lenses which focus and aim the
beam must themselves be carefully shielded from the geomag-
netic field without degrading the energy of the beam.
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3. Kinetic Energy Weapons
Kinetic energy weapons designed for ballistic
missile defense have been under study within the U. S. for
more than two decades. This type of weapon is advantageous
to system designers since KEWs do not require the level of
sophistication as do directed energy weapons. In addition,
although the only U. S. kinetic energy BMD system ever
deployed was dismantled in 1975, the previous defense tech-
nologies provide current researchers with a vast techno-
logical and analytical base from which to proceed.
Most previously conceived kinetic energy BMD systems
utilized a nuclear kill mechanism to accomplish terminal
defense from long range. However, driven by the intent of
the Strategic Defense Initiative, current concepts involve
using either direct impact projectiles or fragmentation
warheads in order to achieve a nonnuclear kill within all
ballistic phases. The two nonnuclear concepts receiving the
most attention are the miniature homing vehicle (MHV) and
the electromagnetic rail gun.
The miniature homing vehicle is a self propelled
missile currently under development as an antisatellite
(ASAT) system. The missile is carried aloft by an F15
aircraft and then uses a two stage rocket to reach low alti-
tude orbiting satellites. Once launched, the MHV homes in on
the target using a cryogenically cooled IR sensor and then
damages the target via direct impact. This concept is
different than the Soviet ASAT system which has a killer
satellite pull up next to a target and then explode, sending
thousands of pieces of shrapnel into the target's control,
electronic, and power systems. As of this writing, the MHV
is the most fully developed potential BMD weapon; however,
whether a satisfactory defensive tier can be built around
this technology remains to be demonstrated.
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The hypervelocity electromagnetic rail gun is a mass
accelerator, based on the idea of a open solenoid, which
launches small direct impact projectiles at speeds on the
order of kilometers/second. In principle, the rail gun is
similar to the electric motor, which uses a magnetic field
to accelerate an armature. The rail gun uses an extremely
powerful magnetic field to force small masses along
conducting rails at high velocity. These masses are
currently inert but the possibility of launching individual
homing missiles via this technology is being considered.
Numerous nonnuclear kill KE systems have been
proposed for terminal defense. The proposals usually include
a rocket armed with a fragmentation warhead or flechetttes.
Of note is a ground-based system named SWARMJET which sprays
large salvos of unguided masses at reentry vehicles during
the last seconds before impact.
For a number of reasons, the driving parameter in
kinetic energy weapon systems is the speed of the projec-
tile. Primarily, the projectile must have sufficient
terminal velocity to impart enough energy on the target to
cause damage. The relationship between velocity and energy
is shown in equation 4.2 where Vt is the terminal velocity
(km/sec), M is the mass (kg) of the projectile, and E is the
energy (Joules) deposited on the target. This requirement
limits the effective range of KEWs travelling through the
atmosphere due the loss of velocity from air friction.
Further, kinetic energy kill vehicles move very slowly in
comparison to directed energy beams and, consequently, the
time window available for intercept within each phase is
dependent on the speed of the projectile rather than the
missile phasing. If boost phase intercept is considered a
system requirement, this dependency may force the use of an
uneconomically large number of KEW satellites. On a positive
note, direct impact kills are immediate; therefore, no dwell
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time is required and numerous targets can be engaged almost
simultaneously.
E = ( M/2 ) Vt 2 (joules) ( eqn 4.2)
Consideration of the speed of intercept brings up
the old question of "can a bullet hit a bullet ?" Killing an
extremely fast moving target via direct impact with an
interceptor hampered by a significantly lesser speed capa-
bility is a difficult task. Prior experience with air
defenses shows that an interceptor requires a significant
advantage in speed to overcome an aircraft. However, reentry
vehicles may travel over twice- as fast as potential KE
interceptors. The important difference is that RVs are on
precise trajectories and cannot maneuver away from - the
interceptor. This difference makes BMD more like satellite
interception than anti-aircraft warfare.
Other important factors in the use of kinetic energy
weapons are the tradeoffs involved in using either guided or
unguided interceptors. The immediately apparent tradeoff is
cost. An interceptor capable of autonomous homing would
obviously cost more than a simple unguided interceptor.
Should guidance be required, a possible solution would be
the use of directed homing. The carrier satellite or ground
system could provide laser or RF designation of targets
thereby eliminating the need for fully autonomous target
detection, tracking, and homing. This configuration would
reduce interceptor complexity, weight, and cost. Another
tradeoff exists in the effectiveness of the projectile. In
the turbulent environment following a nuclear explosion, an
unguided interceptor may not be able to adhere to its
predetermined course and therefore guidance may be required.
In opposition, the use of guidance may constrain space-based
KEWs to exoatmospheric intercept. A kinetic energy
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projectile with IR sensing and homing would be subject to
air friction when passing through the atmosphere. The heat
generated by the air friction might either mask or blind the
IR homing sensor thereby rendering the projectile
ineffective.
4. Emerging Technologies
As technology advances, other weapons concepts are
sure to emerge for consideration. A revisit to this subject
after even a short period of time may find a currently
unconceived device at the forefront.
A promising technology now being reevaluated is the
microwave generator. Microwaves show great promise in that
they are easily generated via conventional high explosive or
nuclear devices and that they propagate through the atmos-
phere unattenuated at all but the most extreme output
levels. A high power microwave DEW could cause degradation
or damage to unshielded electronic and guidance systems by
introducing spurious radiation. Even weak microwaves can
upset circuitry as evidenced by the interaction between
modern microwave ovens and coronary pacemakers. The
effectiveness of this type of "soft" kill would be difficult
to ascertain; therefore, microwaves may be used more as a
harassing tactic than as a kill mechanism. Given extreme
output power levels, microwaves may also be capable of hard
thermal kill. In a manner similar to modern ovens, micro-
waves may provide a rapid heating and cooling sequence that
would stress structural and functional components on the
target. Another potential use of microwaves is for communi-
cations and guidance jamming.
Other potential technologies include enhanced elec-
tromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons and antimatter beams.
Research into EMP has been ongoing since the advent of
nuclear weapons, both as a catastrophic result of nuclear
war and as a possible offensive or defensive asset.
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Antimatter beams are similar to particle beams and would
cause the destruction of individual atomic particles within
the target. While these advanced technologies seem to be
more in the realm of science fiction than of modern alterna-
tives, the designer and decision maker must keep an open
mind for new ideas and possibilities.
C. WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES
Within any weapons system, the method used in deploying
the weapons is as critical as the actual weapons themselves.
Key factors in the feasibility of a weapons system which
depend on the deployment strategy are the overall system
cost, the time available to decision makers for C 3 , the
amount of uncertainty posed to decision makers during the
engagement, and the countermeasures available to the oppo-
nent, to name only a few. BMD system designers are faced
with a set of deployment options which is as large and
varied as the set of weapons technologies previously
discussed. Towards providing a system level understanding of
SDI, this section will define the major deployment options
and discuss the tradeoffs within and between the
alternatives.
1. Boost Phase On-orbit Satellites
The physical laws of nature and the political envi-
ronment of the world combine to require the use of satellite
technology for boost phase interception. Since Soviet ICBM
silos are not within the line of sight of the U. S. or its
allies and since the U. S. cannot station its defenses on or
near Soviet soil, a defense which attempts boost phase
interception must be based in space either before the attack
or during the attack sequence. This requirement presents to
the system designer an extremely complicated problem whose
solution depends on a large number of highly variable param-
eters and political decisions. This requirement has thus
caused most of the discussion, argument, and controversy
within the scientific community.
44
The crux of the problem in on-orbit satellite basing
is how many satellites are required to meet the threat.
Since the satellites will be the "big ticket" items of an
on-orbit boost phase defense, knowledge of the number of
satellites required is paramount in determining total system
cost. The required number of satellites is dependent on a
variety of factors but primarily on the area to be covered
and the effective range of the defensive weapon used.
The area to be covered by a boost phase satellite
defensive tier is tied to the overall goal of the defensive
system. If the U. S. is only concerned with the Soviet ICBM
threat, then only the Soviet homeland needs to be covered.
Conversely, if the U. S. is also concerned by the Soviet SLBM
and IRBM threat or by any ballistic missile fired from any
sector, then global coverage would be required. The effec-
tive range of a defensive satellite depends on the type of
weapon utilized onboard the satellite and its operating
characteristics. The effective range of a directed energy
weapon is contingent on the output power density placed on
the target while the effective range of a kinetic energy
weapon is contingent on its projectile velocity.
The previous two parameters, coverage required and
satellite weapons range, combine to drive a third parameter,
the type of satellite orbit. In a simplistic review of
orbital mechanics, a satellite must be placed into orbit at
a velocity that is sufficiently high so that the satellite
motion can offset the downward pull of gravity and therefore
a stable orbit can be maintained. The altitude at which the
satellite is placed determines the amount of surface area
that the satellite can see; the higher the satellite, the
larger the look area. The altitude also determines the
period of the satellite's orbit, that length of time
required for the satellite to complete one full revolution
around the earth.
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Satellites in a low orbit (up to approximately 1000
km in altitude) have a period of about 1.5 hours or less.
Since the earth also revolves as the satellite orbits but at
a different period (24 hours), a low orbiting satellite will
not always be overhead the same geographic area. Rather, a
low orbiting satellite will be absent from that geographic
area for a specific amount of time, depending on the satel-
lite's period and the inclination of the satellite's orbital
plane relative to the equator. Therefore, to continuously
cover a given geographical point, a number of low orbiting
satellites in different orbits would be required and, to
continuously cover the entire face of the earth, requires
•even more satellites.
The absenteeism problem of low orbiting satellites
can be solved by placing the satellites in orbits high
enough so that the period of the satellite equals the period
of the earth. If the satellite is at this altitude ( approxi-
mately 36000 km) and on the equatorial plane, then the
satellite will remain hovered over the same geographical
area. This type of orbit is called geosynchronous. Due the
high altitude and large stationary look areas, the number of
geosynchronous satellites required would be much less than
the number of low orbiting satellites required.
The above discussion implies that for on-orbit
coverage, either local or global, geosynchronous satellite
basing would be a very attractive method. However, the
weapons effective range must also be factored into the deci-
sion. The amount of beam dispersion that would occur to a
directed energy (laser) beam travelling over 36000 km makes
the use of lasers highly doubtful, even if immense mirrors
and extreme power levels were utilized. Further, the time
requirements imposed on kinetic energy weapons makes the use
of this type of weapon in a geosynchronous orbit physically
impossible. Therefore, a lower orbit is necessary and the
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shorter the maximum lethal range of the weapon, the lower
and more numerous the satellites must be. The problem with
absenteeism then becomes significant.
Given that, due weapons range limitations, a low
non-geosynchronous orbit will be required for boost phase
on-orbit satellite basing, the question of how many satel-
lites are required still remains. Fortunately for the system
architects, at a sufficiently low altitude, the number of
satellites required to cover only a specific geographic area
is not significantly less than the number required for
global coverage. Therefore, a global coverage requirement
can be assumed and absenteeism is not a significant factor.
2. A Model for Determining the Required Number of
Weapons Platforms
In an attempt to quantify the required number of
defensive satellites, the following analysis will develop
simple scaling rules for the number of satellites of a
particular weapons type that are required to meet a given
boost phase threat Additionally, the sensitivity of the
model to variations in input parameters will be investi-
gated. The initial model, developed by the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, is the result of a comparison of a
number of different analyses on BMD laser satellite sizing.
[ Ref . 5: p. 2]. The reader is reminded that the resulting
numbers represent only the weapons platforms required for
boost phase interception and do not include those satellites
that will be necessary for surveillance, command and
control, and possibly later defensive tiers.
The model will initially be developed around the use
of laser beam weapons. The key parameters defining the
offensive threat are :
• the number of missiles launched, M
• the amount of time the missiles are vulnerable to
attack, T ( sees)
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• the hardness of the target. J (MJ/m 2 ). To destroy the
missile. the power density placed on the target must
exceed the missile hardness. This value is a function
of the target's reflectivity and thermal protection.




• the threat rate, M / T (missiles/sec)
The key defensive parameters for a laser weapon are :
• the output power, P (Mwatts)
• the wavelength of the beam, w (m)
• the diameter of the focusing mirror, D (m)
• the range to the target, r (m)




) , of the focused spot is :
a = pi ( d / 2 ) 2
where d is given by equation 4. 1 .
(b) Assuming that the laser's output power is distributed
uniformly across the area of the focused spot, the average
power density, Q ( Mwatts/m 2 ) , can be determined :
Q = P / a
(c) Assuming the laser can instantaneously slew between
targets, the laser's kill rate, K (kills/sec), can be deter-
mined :
K = Q / J
Inputting terms,
K = ( P / a ) / J
=(P/pi(d/2) 2 )/J
= ( P / pi (( 1.22 wr/D)/2) 2 )/J
= ( P / pi ( ( 1.22 wr/2D) 2 ) / J
= ( 4 D 2 P / pi ( 1.22 w r ) 2 ) / J
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K = 4 D 2 P / pi J ( 1.22 w r ) 2 ( eqn 4.3)
NOTE : The above kill rate holds for a specific engagement
range, r. In reality, each laser will have to engage targets
over a range of r values. Therefore, the analyst should
average K over all engagement ranges to determine the
average kill rate, KBAR.
(d) Assume N satellites in low circular orbits providing
global satellite coverage. Further assume the constellation
is constructed so that the satellites are spaced at a
distance of 2 R (m) apart.
(e) Given the radius of the earth, E (km), is 6370 kilo-
meters and assuming the earth has a perfectly spherical
shape, the surface area of the earth, S (
m
2
) , is :
S = 4 pi E 2
(f) Assume R << E. Therefore, the curvature of the earth can
be assumed to be negligible in the following calculations.
For a satellite in low orbit, it is assumed that the subsat-
ellite points on the earth's surface also have a 2 R
spacing. Furthermore, the ground coverage area, Z (
m
2
) , of a
single satellite can be assumed to be circular. Thus :
Z = pi R 2
(g) Under the above assumptions, the relationship between N,
E, and R is :
N = S / Z
= 4 pi E 2 / pi R 2
= ( 2 E / R ) 2
Alternatively,
(h) Given a total launch area, A (
m
2
) , assume the M threat
missiles are distributed uniformly across A. If a satellite
with coverage area Z is over the launch area, then
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R = 2 E / SQRT(N) ( eqn 4.4)
E( no. missiles in Z ) = Z ( M / A )
= m
Further, the number of satellites, n, over the launch area
at any given time is :
n = A / Z
n = A / pi R 2 ( eqn 4. 5)
(i) Assume each of the n satellites attacks the m targets
within its zone. Assume the weapon's maximum lethal range is
equal to R ; therefore, an average target range of R / 2 can
be roughly assumed : Under these assumptions, the kill
rate, k (kills/sec), of an individual satellite can be
determined via equation 4. 3 :
k = 4 D 2 P / pi J (1.22 w ( R / 2 )) 2
= 16 D 2 P / pi J ( 1.22 w R ) 2
The total constellation kill rate, K (kills/sec), of all
satellites above the launch area can also be determined :
K = n k
= ( A / pi R 2 ) 16 D 2 P /pi J (1.22 wR ) 2
= 16 A D 2 P / pi 2 J ( 1.22 w ) 2 R 4
= 16 A D 2 P / pi 2 J ( 1.22 w ) 2 ( 2 E / SQRT(N) ) 4
= 16 A D 2 P / pi 2 J ( 1.22 w ) 2 ( 16 E 4 / N 2 )
= N 2 A D 2 P / pi 2 J E 4 ( 1.22 w ) 2
(j) Assume the total constellation kill rate, K, is equal to
the threat rate, M / T :
M/T = N 2 AD 2 P/ pi 2 J E 4 ( 1. 22 w ) 2 (eqn 4.6)
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NOTE : Equation 4. 6 now encompasses all the givens, leaving
only the unknown N.
(k) To determine the number of satellites required for
global coverage by laser weapons, equation 4. 6 is solved for
N :
N 2 A D 2 P = M pi 2 J E 4 ( 1.22 w ) 2 / T
N 2 = M pi 2 J E 4 ( 1.22 w ) 2 / T A D 2 P
N = ( 1.22 w pi E 2 / D ) SQRT( M J / T A P ) ( eqn 4.7)
Example :
To provide a rough estimate of N, the following
conceptual scenario will be utilized :
Offense :
(a) a launch of 1400 ICBM missiles (from Table II),
(b) distributed over a launch area of 10 Mm 2 (roughly the
land area of the Soviet Union),
with a boost phase of 180 seconds (from Table IV),
and a hardness of 20 kJ/cm 2 ( estimate of future
Soviet solid fueled ICBM booster hardness. RV's would
be harder and satellites softer),
an onstation "20/10" chemical laser defensive system
providing
output power of 20 Mwatts ( estimate of future output
power available),
a beam wavelength of 2.7 microns (current chemical
laser wavelength),
and using a focusing mirror 10 m in diameter ( esti-
mate of future technology. Largest astronomical
mirror currently used is approximately 5m in diam-
eter) .
Calculations :
w = 2. 7 microns
= 2. 7 x 10" 6 m









= 6370 x 10 3 m
J = 20 kJ/cm 2
= 200 x 10 6 J/m 2
= 200 x 10 6 Watt sec/m 2
A = 10 Mm 2
= 10 x 10 12 m 2
P = 20 Mwatts
= 20 x 10 6 watts
From equation 4.7, N = 117.1 ; therefore, 118 laser satel-
lites are required for global coverage and boost phase
intercept. From equation 4. 4, R = 1172. 8 km and from equa-
tion 4.5, 2.3 satellites will be able to see the Soviet
Union at any given time.
Sensitivities :
(a) The driving assumption of the above analysis is
that constellation kill rate (K) is equal to missile threat
rate (M/T). Under this assumption, the defensive
constellation was sized for full stress; that is, the
Soviets may choose to fully stress any defensive system by
launching all the offensive missiles in a nearly simulta-
neous manner. Refering to the example, 1400 missiles simul-
taneously launched while 2. 3 satellites are above the launch
area means that each satellite will have to defend against
1400 / 2. 3 = approximately 609 missiles. Given a vulner-
ability window of 180 sees, each satellite will have to
achieve a kill rate of 609 / 180 = approximately 3. 4
missiles/sec. This figure appears intuitively infeasible;
especially when consideration is given to time factors such
as weapons slew rate and C 3/battle management requirements
which may significantly reduce the window of vulnerability.
Due these technology and management limitations, the system
52
architect may desire to adjust equation 4. 7 by a constant, c
(0 < c < 1, typically), to better relate threat rate to kill
rate (e.g. when under full stress, satellite kill rate may
be only a fraction of missile threat rate). Additionally,
equation 4. 7 might also be adjusted to encompass a more
limited single tier goal; that is, the architecture may only
require that a fraction, c, of the missiles be addressed by
the boost phase defensive tier. Equation 4. 7 would then
become :
N = ( 1.22 w pi E 2 / D ) SQRT( c M J / T A P ) ( eqn 4.8)
(b) As previously noted, the assumption of an
average target range provides a simple point estimate of the
constellation kill rate. A better estimate could be achieved
by averaging the individual satellite kill rate, k, over all
feasible values of target range.
(c) Under the assumptions, the significant defensive
parameter interaction within equation 4. 7 is between N and
the output power, P. The number of satellites decreases
with the square root of any output power increase.
Therefore, increasing output power by a factor of four
decreases the number of satellites by a factor of two.
(d) The significant offensive parameter interactions
with N, under the assumptions, are as follows :
(1) The number of satellites required increases
with the square root of the number of missiles launched,
i.e. four times the number of missiles doubles the number of
satellites required.
(2) The number of satellites required also
increases with the square root of missile hardness; if
missile hardness is increased by a factor of four, then
twice as many satellites will be required.
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(3) The vulnerability window relates to the
number of satellites required by the inverse of the square
root of its change. Shortening the amount of time a missile
is vulnerable to one quarter of the original window doubles
the number of satellites required.
(4) The size of the launch area and the number
of satellites required also relate by the inverse of the
square root; e. g. decreasing the size of the launch area by
a factor of four requires twice as many satellites to be
used. This relationship may not initially seem correct to
the reader. However, a driving consideration in constella-
tion sizing is the density of the missiles to be faced;
therefore, by placing their missiles in a small geographic
area, the Soviets force the U. S. to place more satellites
overhead to meet the increased density. Due the absentee
problem of low orbits, this increase must occur throughout
the global constellation.
The above model was adapted by the author for the
utilization of kinetic energy weapons. The key defensive
parameter is the velocity, V (m/sec), of the rocket or
rocket projectile.
(a) The velocity of the projectile and the vulnerability
window determine the maximum range of the weapon, Rmax (m) :
Rmax = T V
(b) Setting Rmax equal to the half-swath width of the satel-
lite, equation 4. 4 can be used to determine the total number
of satellites required for global coverage :
N = ( 2 E / Rmax ) 2
(c) Equation 4.5 determines the number of satellites over
the launch area :
n = A / pi Rmax 2
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(d) The kill rate required by each satellite can be calcu-
lated :
k = ( M / n ) / T
= M / n T
(e) Assuming that each KE interceptor has the same prob-
ability of kill (Pk) associated to it and that the shots are
independent, then the number of shots required for an indi-
vidual missile kill, S, is a geometric random variable with
a mean of ( 1 / Pk ) and a variance of ( 1 - Pk ) / Pk 2 .
(f) Each satellite engages ( M / n ) missiles. Assume this
value is deterministic and, therefore, has no variance in
the following calculations.
( g) The number of interceptors, i, required aboard each
satellite can be quantified as follows :
i = ( M / n ) S
E(i) = E( ( M / n ) S )
= ( M / n ) E(S)
= ( M / n ) ( 1 / Pk )
= M / n Pk
VAR( i ) = VAR( ( M / n ) S )
= ( M / n ) 2 Var( S)
= ( M / n ) 2 ( ( 1 - Pk ) / Pk 2 )
SD(i) = ( M / n ) SQRT( 1 - Pk ) / Pk
(h) The total number of interceptors, I, required for global
boost phase interception can also be quantified :
I = N i
E( I) = E( N i )
= N E( i)
= N M / n Pk
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VAR( I ) = VAR( N i )
= N 2 Var(i)
=( N M / n ) 2 ( ( 1 - Pk ) / Pk 2 )
SD( I ) = ( N M / n ) SQRT( 1 - Pk ) / Pk
Example :
The parameters proposed for the previous example
will again be utilized. Additionally, a projectile velocity
of 5 km/sec and a Pk of .9 will be assumed.
Calculations :
V = 5 km/sec
= 5 x 10 3 m/sec
Rmax = 9 x 10 5 m
N = 200. 37 satellites
= 201 satellites total
n = 3. 93 satellites over the launch area
k = 1. 98 kills/sec
E( i ) = 395.8 interceptors/satellite
= 396 interceptors/satellite
SD( i ) = 125.2 interceptors/satellite
= 125 interceptors/satellite
E( I ) = 79,596 interceptors total
SD( I ) = 25,125 interceptors
Therefore, 201 satellites each carrying 396 inter-




(a) The expected value results of i and I in the
above analysis would still hold if the number of targets is
itself a random variable with mean ( M / n ). This is
because i and I would now be random sums of random vari-
ables. The variance and standard deviation would not be the
same but rather would have to capture the variability in the
number of targets.
(b) Although this analysis did not specifically
address the relationship between kill rate and threat rate,
the resultant kill rate required under full stress
( k = 1. 98 kills/sec ) does not appear unattainable.
Further, the significant problem of target dwell is not
present in this scenario; however,, missile kill assessment
becomes much more important.
(c) The significant defensive parameter interac-
tions, under the assumptions, are :
(1) Maximum range increases proportionally with
velocity; further, the total number of satellites required
and the number of satellites over the launch area both vary
with the inverse of the square of the factor of increase.
Therefore, doubling the projectile velocity doubles the
maximum range and decreases the number of satellites by a
factor of four. Note, however, that the expected total
number of interceptors required, I, is a function of M, A,
and Pk, but not Rmax.
(2) As the probability of kill decreases, both
the total required number of interceptors and the required
number of interceptors per satellite increase.
(d) Under the assumptions, the significant offensive
parameter interactions are with the window of vulnerability,
T. Rmax increases proportionally with the vulnerability
window; therefore, similar to changes in velocity, as T
doubles, Rmax doubles and both N and n decrease by a factor
of four.
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Adapting the model for neutral particle beams
weapons is much more difficult due the current uncertainties
in the effectiveness of a particle beam kill mechanism.
Additionally, neutral particles can propagate in space over
great distances at essentially the speed of light with
little degradation in beam quality; therefore, a neutral
particle beam weapon can conceivably be deployed geosynchro-
nously. If so, as few as two satellites could be required
for global coverage. For arguments sake, however, assume
that for effective C 3/battle management the satellites are
placed into low orbit at approximately 1000 km altitude.
Since neutral particle beams travel in a straight line, at
this altitude the line of sight distance to the horizon is
approximately 3500 km and, therefore, the half-swath width
(R) is approximately 3350 km. Assuming an instantaneous slew
and kill, equation 4.4 can be used to roughly determine the
required number of satellites :
N = ( 2 E / R ) 2
= 14. 46
= 15 satellites
As previously noted, the number of satellites
required for each type of weapon includes only weapons
platforms and not C 3 , battle management, or surveillance
satellites. Consideration should also be given to anti-
satellite satellites (ASATs) and defense-of-satellite satel-
lites (DSATs). Of additional note is the fact that no
redundancy was factored into the calculations. For surviv-
ability, it may be desirable to use several layers of satel-
lite redundancy or to use more, less utile satellites to
form a single reliable layer.
3. Other Satellite Deployment Options
The large numbers of satellites required and their
sensitivities pose monumental problems to the system archi-
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tect. Another significant problem is the requirement of
power storage. The technologies previously discussed, with
the exception of the Xray laser, all require huge amounts of
chemical fuels and/or immense levels of electrical power
which must be instantaneously available. Further, the power
sources must be protected against attack. These problems
cause system designers to consider ground basing the prin-
ciple components of the defensive system.
One method under consideration for laser weapons is
to base only the target sensors and aiming mirrors in space
while basing a number of extremely powerful lasers and their
companion power supplies safely on the ground. Under this
scenario, two levels of orbiting mirrors would be required.
The laser system would first direct the beam to a large
mirror in a high, possibly geosynchronous, orbit in order to
carry the beam around the curvature of the earth. The beam
would then be redirected to smaller mirrors in low orbit and
then focused onto individual targets.
This method presents several obstacles to the system
architect. The fragile relay and aiming mirrors would be
without the inherent protection of an on-orbit weapons
system and would be extremely vulnerable to ASAT technolo-
gies; therefore, some fashion of defense would be required.
Providing this defense may prove to be as costly as
defending on-orbit power sources. Perhaps more significant
is the tradeoff in the amount of power required. A ground
based laser beam, under this scenario, would have to travel
many times the range required of an on-station laser in
order to reach the target. Further, during its travel the
beam would pass through the atmosphere and be refocused by
the space mirrors. The large increase in power required to
offset losses via attenuation and reflection could drive
system cost far above that of a space based power source.
Other concerns include the uncertainties as to the effect of
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weather on propagating the beam into space and the ability
to provide global coverage when ground basing the system on
U. S. or friendly soil.
Another ground basing method under consideration is
the "pop-up" Xray laser. The potentially small size and
light weight of this type of kill mechanism may make it
possible to deploy Xray laser satellites on the ground,
launching them into space only upon indication of a missile
launch. This scenario would resolve the concern of having
nuclear weapons continually orbiting overhead and could
conceivably significantly reduce the number of laser plat-
forms required, dependent on the ground deployment strategy.
The driving parameter behind the pop-up method is
the amount of time available to the laser to fire its pulse.
Due the earth's curvature, the laser must rise to a high
altitude before firing in order to achieve a direct line of
sight to the target. Indication and confirmation of a launch
threat, C 3 , and weapons deployment must all occur before
missile busing is concluded; otherwise, the significant
leverage of boost phase interception is lost.
The time factor involved requires the ground based
satellites be deployed as near as possible to the missile
launch area. When addressing the Soviet ICBM threat, this
means the satellites must be ground deployed near the Soviet
borders; therefore, either within allied territory or
onboard submarines lingering off the Soviet coast. Basing
additional nuclear weapons in allied countries may prove
politically infeasible. Basing the weapons at sea may be
more feasible; however, submarine basing presents its own
formidable set of problems. Unless the United States is
willing to give up its current SLBM capabilities, a new
fleet of missile submarines will be required. Additionally,
a new fleet of surface ships to support and protect the
submarine fleet would also be necessary. Submarine basing of
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a defensive system that would be instantaneously needed may
further require decentralization and restructuring of
present nuclear command authority. Due the short timeline
available for C 3 , each submarine commander may have to
decide if and when to deploy the pop-up system for the
system to effectively meet a boost phase threat.
4. Post-Boost / Midcourse Strategies
The use of both space based and ground based weapons
technologies is envisioned for the middle stages of a multi-
tiered ballistic missile defense. While the satellites used
for boost phase defense will have some utility within the
post-boost and midcourse phases, other layers of satellites
of differing types of technology are being considered. These
additional layers would provide a level of satellite redun-
dancy and therefore reliability. The layers would further
negate the possibility of the system being countered by a
single countermeasure targeted against a specific
technology.
The ground based component could consist of either
directed energy weapons, pop-up systems, or long range
kinetic energy weapons. An interesting concept under discus-
sion for use with the ground based components is that of an
airborne adjunct, a long endurance aircraft that would be
placed into position upon warning of an impending attack.
This platform would be equipped with a variety of sensors
and communications systems and would be used as a battle
manager in the late midcourse and early terminal phases.
5. Terminal Defense
The deployment strategy of terminal defenses, as
well as the ultimate cost, again depends on the goal of the
defense. The system designer is concerned with defending two
types of targets - military value and social value. Each
target type allows for a different defensive strategy. The
goal of the defense tasks the system designer with
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protecting one type of target or the other or, quite
possibly, both; thus, the designer must tailor a strategy to
meet the overall system goal.
Military value targets are considered as hard, point
targets such as ICBM silos. An effective defense of military
value targets provides the ability to launch a retaliatory
strike. The amount of retaliatory force available depends on
the type of defensive strategy used. First consider the case
where no defense is available and all incoming RVs are
targeted against hardened ICBM silos. Given a RV can disable
a missile silo with probability p , the silo can launch its
missile in retaliation with probability ( 1 - p ). The value
of p is a function of the silo's hardness, the RV's accu-
racy, and the warhead's megatonnage. If r independent
attacks occur on the silo, then the silo will survive all
the attacks with probability ( 1 - p ) r . Assume there are
L missile silos. If the attacker uniformly targets R RVs
across all L silos ( nonpreferential attack), then the
average number of RVs per silo is r = R / L. Under this
scenario, the expected number of surviving retaliatory
missiles (S) can be determined via equation 4.9
Therefore, the number of missiles available for a retalia-
tory strike is driven, in the short term, by the number of
RVs that are launched [ Ref . 6: p. 2]. As a numerical
example, the U. S. currently has approximately L = 1000 silos
and, from Table II , approximately 1000 to 10000 Soviet ICBM
and SLBM RVs can be launched. Assume p = 0. 5. From equa-
tion 4.9, Soviet attacks with r = 1, 5, or 10 RVs per silo
provide approximately 500, 31, or 1 expected surviving
missiles, respectively.
S = L ( 1 - p ) r (eqn 4. 9)
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The effectiveness of a retaliatory strike with
the S surviving missiles depends on the retaliatory
missiles' own p values and on the possibility that the
attacking force has its own defense against such an effort.
The force being attacked can attempt to increase the number
of surviving missiles by defending its silos. This defensive
strategy can be either preferential or nonpreferential and
is driven, in the form of a two person game, by both sides'
knowledge of their opponent's weapons stockpile level,
weapons effectiveness, and targeting strategy.
Nonpreferential defense simply allots the defensive
capability uniformly across all silos; therefore, given the
defense has I interceptors available, a nonpreferential
defense would allot ( I / L ) interceptors to each silo.
This type of defense might be considered if all the silos
are of equal value and a nonpreferential attack is assumed.
However, in this instance, nonpreferential defense provides
little leverage to the defending force unless the number of
available interceptors is equal to or greater than the
number of incoming reentry vehicles. Continuing the previous
example, assume I = 3000 interceptors are available and are
deployed nonpreferentially. For simplicity, further assume
the interceptors have a probability of kill of 1. Therefore,
R = 1000, 5000, and 10000 drops to R = 0, 2000, and 7000
and, from equation 4.9, Soviet attacks with r = 0, 2, and 7
RVs per silo provide approximately 1000, 250, and 8 expected
surviving missiles, respectively. The nonpreferentially
attacking force can negate a nonpreferential defense by
simply using more RVs than the number of interceptors avail-
able to the defense, should this value be known.
Preferential defense can present a more attractive
option. A preferential defensive strategy protects only a
subset of the targets with all the defenses available,
leaving the undefended silos to attract a large percentage
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of the incoming RVs. The value of this strategy is predi-
cated by not allowing the offense to know which silos are
defended or at what level. Assuming the attacker does not
know the protection level provided to any given silo, a
possible offensive strategy would be to again nonpreferen-
tially allot ( R / L ) RVs per silo. Further assuming this
offensive strategy is known to the defense, the defense can
now protect I/(R/L)=IL/R silos completely. As long
as I L >> R, the defense has gained significant leverage
[Ref. 6: p. 3].
To- illustrate, assume the attacker desires to
disable 75 % of the missile silos in the hopes that the
defense cannot launch an effective retaliatory effort with
the remaining 25 % of the silos. Further assume the
attacker knows the number of interceptors available to the
defense but not which of the equally valued silos are
defended. Under this scenario and continuing with the
previous example (p = .5), the two defensive strategies can
be compared on a cost basis by the number of RVs required by
the offense for the terminal phase.
(a) Under nonpreferential offensive and defensive strat-
egies, the offense would initially exhaust the defense's
stockpile of interceptors and then utilize whatever number
of additional RVs per silo that the attacker expected to be
required to meet the offensive goal. Since the number of
additional RVs required would actually follow a binomial
distribution, this scenario assumes the attacker is satis-
fied with a mean level of disabled silos of . 75 L. With
independent shots, to achieve a probability of kill of . 75
two RVs would have to be targeted at each silo after the
interceptors have been exhausted. Therefore, the expected
cost to the offense per silo would be :
R/L=( I/L) + 2
= ( 3000 / 1000 ) + 2
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= 5 RVs/silo
The expected overall cost to the offense in terminal phase
RVs would then be :
(1000 silos) 5 RVs/silo = 5000 RVs
(b) In comparison, a nonpreferential attack on preferen-
tially defended silos could cost the offense much more.
Given that the number of RVs to be faced in the terminal
phase is known, the defense could preferentially allocate
R / L interceptors on each of I L / R silos to maximize the
number of silos fully defended. The expected number of silos
to survive the attack would then be :
E( survivors ) = ( IL/R) + (L - ( IL/R) ) (1 - p) R/L
The offense must set R large enough to reduce the expected
number of surviving silos to .25 L. So,
( IL/R) + (L - ( IL/R)) ( 1 - p) R/L = .25 L
(3000( 1000)/R) + (1000 - (3000( 1000)/R)
)
(3000000/R) + (1000 - (3000000/R)) (.5) R/1000 = 250
( ) (.5) R/100 ° = 250
The R satisfying this equation is approximately 12009, which
provides 12009 / 1000 = 12.009 RVs/silo. If fractional RVs
are not allowed, the offense would require 13 RVs/silo for a
total of 13000 RVs. For an R of 13000, the expected number
of surviving silos is 230. 86 .
To summarize this limited scenario, a preferential
defensive strategy can clearly provide significant leverage
(13000/5000 = 2.6) to the defense over a nonpreferential
strategy when faced with a nonpreferential attack. It can
be shown that, for fixed silo and reentry vehicle levels and
a fixed probability of silo kill, a preferential defense can
be found that is always at least as good as nonpreferential
defense when faced with a uniform, nonpreferential attack.
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(a) Define P( I ) as the expected number of surviving silos
under preferential defense and uniform attack as a function
of I :
P(I) = (IL/R) + (L - (IL/R)) (1 - p)R/L
(b) Define NP( I ) as the expected number of surviving silos
under nonpreferential defense and uniform attack as a func-
tion of I :
NP( I) = L(l - p) (R_I)/L
(c) It can be shown that P( I ) is greater than or equal to
NP( I ) for all values of I between and R. Note that, since
the interceptor probability of kill is assumed to be 1, the
case of I > R constitutes a perfect defense.
(d) Significant relationships :
(1) P(I) is linear in I.
(2) NP( I ) is convex in I.
(3) P(0) = NP(O)
P(R) = NP(R)
(e) Therefore, for z ranging from to 1,
NP( z + (1 - z) R ) < z NP(O) + (1 - z) NP(R)
(from (2) above and the definition of a convex function)
< z P( 0) + ( 1 - z) P(R)
( from ( 3 ) above)
<P( zO + (l-z)R)
(from (1) above and the definition of a linear function)
(f) Letting I=zO+(l-z)R gives the result of
P( I) > NP( I).
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NOTES
(a) It is not surprising that P(I) ^ NP( I ) since the
state of knowledge is different in either case. The
preferential defense considered uses the fact that R
is known while the nonpreferential defense does not.
(b) There are numerous other scenarios where preferential
defense could perform worse than nonpreferential
defense. For example, using all the interceptors to
defend one silo could be a particularly bad preferen-
tial defense.
(c) The offense can degrade the leverage of preferential
defense by adopting a "shoot- look- shoot tactic where
the attack is launched in two waves. The first wave
is used to discover which silos are being protected
while the second wave is used to concentrate fire
onto these defended targets. However, this tactic
increases risk to the offense since it may be
Eossible for a retaliatory strike to be launched
etween the offensive waves.
(d) The above notes point out the fact that terminal
defense is really a complex two person game and
should be analyzed as such. Much effort has already
been conducted in this area [ Ref . 7].
The offense, of course, is not limited to nonprefer-
ential attack. Alternatively, the offense could choose to
preferentially attack only a fraction of the silos, at a
high probability of kill, while assuming the reduced number
of missiles in the remaining silos could not launch an
effective retaliatory effort. Numerous additional scenarios
can be defined encompassing variations of offensive and
defensive preferential and nonpreferential strategies at
various weapons levels and states of knowledge [ Ref. 7]
.
These scenarios are not as easily quantified as the previous
example due the intricacies of a two person rational oppo-
nent game. In any of the conflict variations, however, the
key to an effective defense of military value targets is not
allowing the attacking force to know which silos are being
protected or at what level. Thus the attacker is forced to
heavily attack at increased cost to achieve his goal.
The concept of a passive preferential defense has
been recently considered for use with the United States' MX
ICBM missile system. Instead of actively defending missile
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silos, the strategy would be to deceptively base the
missiles in a large number of hardened silos, analogous to
the old shell game, thereby causing the attacker to futilely
expend a large number of RVs on empty missile silos. This
concept is known as the multiple protective shelter (MPS) or
"racetrack" strategy.
Preferential defense would not be a politically
feasible option for defending social value targets. Social
value targets are soft, area targets such as large cities.
Grassroots logic would not allow one city to be defended
while another is sacrificed; therefore, nonpreferential
defense is required and the leverage shifts back to the
offense. For example, an attacker uses R RVs to attack-C
cities protected by I interceptors. Without an extremely
high level of civil defense, the attacker's probability of
kill (p) rises to 1. The attacker now has the option of
using only r = ( I / C ) + 1 RVs to attack each of ( R / r )
cities, thereby providing him with the same leverage in
preferential attack of social value targets as the defense
has in preferential defense of military value targets. To
destroy all C cities, the attackers minimum cost in RVs
(under the assumptions) is only R = I + C.
Another driving parameter in the defense of military
value and social value targets is the amount of time avail-
able to the terminal defense. Hard, point targets must be
attacked with high accuracy via groundburst or low airburst
weapons. This allows the defense to launch interceptors at
close range under short timelines. In contrast, soft area
targets can be attacked with much less accuracy and with a
high airburst. Therefore, the defense would have to commit
its interceptors much earlier with much less time for battle
management. As a direct result, many more interceptors would
probably be needed to insure an effective defense.
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The combination of strategic leverage and time
requirements indicate that social value defense is a
different and much more difficult task than military value
defense. Determining the mix of targets to be defended, both
military and social value, is a complex, political decision
upon which rests the ultimate effectiveness and cost of any
ballistic missile defense.
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V. HOW MUCH WILL IT COST ?
In order to determine the cost effectiveness of
deploying a ballistic missile defense, the decision maker
must first have a reasonable estimate of the life cycle
costs of the system. Unfortunately, given the immaturity of
the technologies and architectures proposed and due the lack
of a clearly defined goal, reliable estimates of these costs
cannot be presently made. This section will attempt,
however, to provide a few broad brush indicators of the
major cost areas and define rough parametric cost estimating
relationships (CERs) based on proposed technological
capabilities.
The present SDI program thrust is to facilitate a deci-
sion in the early 1990' s as to whether BMD is feasible and,
if so, how the defense should be constructed. This research
and development effort was divided into five major cost
elements and budgeted through 1989 at a cost of $ 25
billion, as seen in Table V . Note that this sum is merely
a down payment on the defensive system, which itself can be
expected to cost at least tens of billions of dollars more.
Actual costs, of course, cannot be determined until
specific systems are selected. Nonetheless, various groups
have tried to establish cost ranges for developing a BMD
system based on analogy to past U. S. large scale develop-
mental efforts such as the Space Shuttle. A committee of
Soviet scientists determined the overall development cost of
a single layer space based BMD to be between $ 140 billion
and $ 550 billion [ Ref . 8: p. 23]. This estimate essen-
tially agreed with DoD projections, reported to Congress in
January 1982, which placed the cost of a single layer space
based BMD at $ 100 billion if the system goal was to merely
limit losses during a nuclear strike to $ 500 billion if the
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TABLE V
DOD BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM FUNDING
Funding levels in mill ions of 1984 dollars:
FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89
SATKA 366. 5 721.0 1500. 1900. 2700. 3300.
DEWs 322.5 489. 1000. 1200. 1400. 1400.
KEWs 195. 8 356. 870. 3 1300. 1500. 1700.
ORSA 82. 7 99. 137. 5 227. 260. 1 288. 4
Support 23. 5 112. 270. 8 321. 9 453. 666. 7












system goal was to provide a "perfect" defense [ Ref . 8: p.
23] . Another analysis by the Soviets states that "western
estimates putting the cost of a multilayer space antimissile
system at $ 1. 5 or $ 2 trillion appear to be justified.
"
[Ref. 9]
It may become possible to parametrically estimate some
areas of life cycle cost. For example, a rough parametric
estimate of a space based system's deployment cost can be
determined if the weapon' s fuel requirements are known.
Considering first laser weapons, roughly 1 kg of laser fuel
(e.g. H2F2) will yield . 5 MJ of laser energy [Ref. 10: p.
101] . Utilizing the assumptions and findings of the
previous example on satellite requirements, the weight of
the fuel required in orbit can be determined :
20 MWatts = 20 MJ/sec
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20 MJ/sec ( 1 kg / . 5 MJ ) = 40 kg/sec
40 kg/sec ( 180 sec ) = 7200 kg
7200 kg ( 2.2 lb/kg ) / ( 2000 lb/ton ) =7.92 tons/sat
= 8 tons/sat
8 tons/sat ( 118 sats ) = 944 tons of fuel required
Assuming the current Space Shuttle will be used to place
the satellites in orbit, the cost of lifting one ton of
payload into orbit is approximately $ 3 million [ Ref . 10:
p. 101] . This cost would vary with the type of orbit and
may significantly decrease as the number of launches
required increases; however, due a lack of system defini-
tion, $ 3 million/ton will be used.
944 tons ( $ 3 million/ton ) = $ 2832 million
The total weight of the satellite would reasonably be at
least twice the weight of the fuel. Therefore, the system
deployment cost can be roughly estimated at 2 times $ 2832
million or $ 5. 664 billion per satellite layer. The reader
must realize that this estimate is also subject to the
assumptions and sensitivities of the model previously
discussed.
Similarly, a rough estimate based on fuel requirements
can also be made for kinetic energy interceptor rockets.
Assuming a 5 kg mass warhead, fuel weighing approximately
9 times this mass is required to bring the warhead to a
velocity of 5 km/sec [Ref. 11: p. 35]. Therefore, each
interceptor would weigh approximately 50 kg. The system
deployment cost can now be estimated :
50 kg ( 80000 interceptors ) = 4 x 10 6 kg
4 x 10 6 kg ( 2.2 lb/kg ) / ( 2000 lb/ton) = 4400 tons
4400 tons ( $ 3 million/ton ) = $ 13.2 billion
The weight of the satellite launch platforms could again
be reasonably guessed to be twice the weight of the
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interceptors; therefore, the system deployment cost can be
roughly estimated at $ 26. 4 billion. Once more, this value
is subject to the assumptions and sensitivities of the
previous model. Both of the above cost estimates would climb
rapidly if the mirrors were imperfect, the kill rate did not
meet the threat rate, redundancy was desired, etc.
As indicated in Table V , a number of other develop-
mental efforts will be required in addition to developing
weapons technologies. The intricate battle management
necessitated by a multilevel system will require advances in
high speed, large volume computing technologies, which may
possibly be based in space. The immense amounts of energy
that would be required by a DEW system under full stress
could not be stored for instantaneous discharge by any pres-
ently known technology; therefore, special multi-megawatt
power plants would have to be developed. The requirement for
rapidly ( and cheaply) lifting large amounts of weight into
space may call for an improved lift capability. Based on
current Space Shuttle operations, it would take several
years to establish an operational system in space.
Consequently, either Shuttle capabilities and scheduling
would have to be increased or a new heavy lift launch
vehicle (HLLV) would have to be developed to support rapid
system deployment. Each of the above efforts will have a
significant impact on the ultimate cost and cost effective-
ness of the SDI program.
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VI. BMD COUNTERMEASURES
The history of warfare in general indicates that a
rational opponent will respond to any new weapons system by
attempting to develop countermeasures, either offensive or
defensive and at the lowest level of technology necessary,
which will restore the opponent's ability to inflict damage
to previously planned levels. In the case of multitiered
BMD, the range and variety of responses available to the
Soviets is so broad that no one can state with any certainty
which of the more plausible countermeasures the Soviet Union
might decide to employ. It is this uncertainty as to the
Soviet response that drives much of the uncertainty as to
the ultimate feasibility of ballistic missile defense.
In a classical Catch-22 situation, the uncertainty of
the Soviet response grows, in part, from the uncertainty of
the United States' ultimate goal and eventual architecture
for BMD. To reduce these uncertainties, it is therefore
essential to consider possible countermeasures to the
various potential technologies in numerous possible archi-
tectures in order to further define the valid options for an
effective defense. This can be considered as a winnowing
process—the goals of SDI drive its potential technologies
while a study of the possible countermeasures filters the
technologies into feasible architectures. Further, an anal-
ysis of the impact on a proposed BMD architecture by an
improved (via countermeasures) offense should also be accom-
panied by an analysis of the cost required to improve the
defense to such a level that it cannot be effectively
overcome.
While no precise, indepth analyses can be presently
conducted due the lack of goal definition, countermeasures
can be identified and simple heuristic estimates of their
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cost, to both the offense and defense, can be determined.
This is not to say that the level of uncertainty will be
significantly reduced or that a particular architecture will
be shown to be optimal. Because BMD is a game played against
a hostile opponent rather than an optimization problem in a
controlled environment, a great deal of uncertainty will
always remain. Analysis can however provide the decision
maker with an idea of the tradeoffs, both in cost and uncer-
tainty, that exist when a particular countermeasure is used
against a particular technology or architecture.
One of the fundamental criteria of the defensive system
is that it must be cost effective at the margin. That is, to
-remain effective, the cost of an incremental increase in
defensive capability must be less than that of the increase
in offensive capability that spurred the change. If the
defense is cost effective, then there is no incentive to the
offense to increase its capability to attempt to overcome
the defense. Otherwise, a proliferation of countermeasures
and additional offensive weapons would be encouraged instead
of a stabilization or possibly a reduction in offensive
forces. The reader should note that this criterion also
holds for the offense. If the offense cannot cheaply circum-
vent the defense, it may be pressured to itself change from
an offensive to a defensive posture. However, if countermea-
sures were cheaper, then the offense could be built faster
and on a scale larger than the planned defense. The current
arms race would then continue.
As previously mentioned, the cost to the defense of a
particular countermeasure can be considered to be the cost
required to improve the defense so that planned effective-
ness levels are met. The cost to the offense of a particular
countermeasure is more difficult to determine. Each
possible offensive response involves a number of tradeoffs.
Countermeasures compete with other military programs for
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available resources; therefore, a net reduction in offensive
capability may result. Countermeasures also compete among
themselves. A countermeasure taken against a particular
defensive technology may make it more difficult to use coun-
termeasures against other defensive components. For example,
hardening the booster rockets against DEWs reduces the
payload available for additional warheads or penetration
aids.
Towards determining the tradeoffs in BMD driven by coun-
termeasures, a number of different offensive responses will
be identified and analyzed. These responses can be divided
into three major categories : countermeasures of preemptive
attack, countermeasures of offensive proliferation, and
countermeasures of defense degradation. The defined counter-
measures should be considered as merely a representative set
of all the different responses available to the Soviets.
Nonetheless, this set can be used to judge and assist in the
design of any proposed architecture.
A. PREEMPTIVE ATTACK
Once the United States commits itself to deploying a
ballistic missile defense in space, the Soviet Union will
inevitably begin to seek out methods to overcome the
defense. The most obvious way for the Soviets to achieve
their goal is to simply destroy or incapacitate the defense
prior to launching their offensive missiles. This type of
decapitation attack can be accomplished by using any of a
variety of antisatellite (ASAT) devices and tactics.
Defense suppression via the use of ASATs provides
significant numerical and cost leverage favorable to the
offense. Using the previous model of laser weapons platforms
as an example, each boost phase defensive satellite
destroyed or incapacitated over the Soviet Union prior to
launch allows 609 missiles to deliver their payload to the
next phase. This leverage could be even more favorable if
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the offense incapacitates sensor or battle management satel-
lites. Due the significant leverage of defense suppression,
it therefore becomes paramount to an effective defense that
the critical components, both ground and space based, be
made survivable.
Survivability is also a concern for other reasons in
addition to leverage. Current satellites are extremely vuln-
erable to ASATs since they are soft targets in completely
predictable orbits. Future defensive satellites must be made
reasonably invulnerable against an ASAT effort; otherwise,
the vulnerable defense would become a tempting target during
any period of conflict and could tend to intensify low level
conflicts. Therefore, without a sufficient level of surviv-
ability, space based BMD could decrease rather than enhance
stability.
An offensive ASAT effort will always have the advantage
over any effort to protect the defensive satellites for two
primary reasons. The offense does not have to attack all the
defensive satellites but merely has to cut a "hole" or
launch window into the defensive architecture. Further, the
offense can pick the time and sequence of the attack. A
pertinent question is "When will the ASATs strike ?" The
Soviets could even choose not to wait until the defensive
system is fully deployed but rather to attack during system
assembly when the satellites are most vulnerable. Since a
Soviet decision to fight today rather than face possible
inferiority tomorrow is not totally implausible, this factor
will make the transition period especially tense.
The only benefit the United States would receive from a
Soviet ASAT strike attempt is the indication of an imminent
Soviet first strike. The U. S. may therefore choose to estab-
lish and publicly declare a policy of "launch upon attack"
whereas any Soviet ASAT attack on the defense will result in
the U. S. launch of retaliatory missiles. Note, however,
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that this type of retaliatory policy is counter to the
stated goal of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
1. Offensive ASAT Potions
The large number of antisatellite devices and
tactics available to the Soviets can be classified into five
major groups—nonnuclear direct ascent, nuclear direct
ascent, ground based DEWs, space based DEWs, and space
mines. It is conceivable that, just as the U. S. would use a
variety of defensive technologies so that no single counter-
measure would suffice, the Soviet Union would also use a
variety of ASAT devices and tactics from these groups so
that no single counter-countermeasure could negate the
Soviet effort.
The only type of ASAT technology currently being
developed by either party is nonnuclear direct ascent. The
Soviet Union has a demonstrated ASAT capability based on
their GALOSH missiles. The missile transits from the earth
to a position close to the target satellite and then
explodes on command, sending debris hurtling into the
target. Nonnuclear direct ascent kills do not have to be as
precise nor as obvious to the defense. A simpler measure
would be to place a cloud of steel pellets into the same
orbit as the target satellite but in the opposite direction.
The relative velocity between the two bodies would be about
16 km/sec which is 8 times faster than modern armor piercing
projectiles. If the satellite is impacted, a single one
ounce pellet of steel could penetrate approximately 15 cm
( 6 in) of steel plate or further if properly shaped
[ Ref . 12]. Nonnuclear direct ascent ASATs against laser
weapons can be made simper still. Since the effectiveness of
the laser depends upon the precision of its targeting
mirror, merely degrading this surface would severely
constrain the weapon. Therefore, a possible ASAT tactic
would be to place a load of fine, unshaped particles in the
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path of the orbiting satellite which could pit the mirror
thereby rendering the weapon ineffective.
Nuclear direct ascent ASAT tactics would be more
likely to be used to degrade the entire BMD system rather
than kill individual satellites. Electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) is particularly severe in space and a single multimeg-
aton nuclear explosion above the atmosphere would blanket a
large area of the earth with high EMP levels. This action
could produce damaging surges in sensor, battle management,
and communications electronics. Precursor nuclear salvos
within the atmosphere could produce atmospheric turbulence
to such a degree that a defensive architecture that depended
on a ground based laser would be crippled. In addition, the
resultant radiation from these airbursts would degrade
communications between defensive satellites and possibly
blackout targeting and tracking radars on the ground. The
immense levels of IR radiation produced by a nuclear blast
in the atmosphere may also be sufficient to blind IR optical
sensors, both ground and space based.
Should the Soviet Union acquire or develop directed
energy weapons technologies of the same magnitude and
quality as those proposed by the U. S. for BMD, it becomes
probable that the Soviets would use this technology to
attempt to regain their present status. Ground based lasers
of extremely high power could be used to destroy space based
defensive assets or, at least, bathe the satellites' optical
sensors with blinding IR radiation. If the Soviets field
their own DEW satellites, an ASAT "space war" could develop
between the two systems. Since a DEW that can rapidly kill
hardened reentry vehicles could surely be used against a
satellite in a known orbit, this war could be fought and
decided in a matter of seconds.
A possible ASAT tactic that generates a great deal
of concern for the defense is the use of space mines. A
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space mine would be a coorbiting satellite launched in
peacetime that would remain within its lethal range of a
defensive satellite. The satellite would be detonated at
will via ground command at the onset of a first strike,
disabling the defensive satellite by either nuclear or
nonnuclear means. The satellite would also be salvage fused;
that is, set to detonate if it is tampered with in any
fashion. The use of space mines could lead to further desta-
bilization of relations between the superpowers. Further,
the Soviet Union has set a historical precedent for the use
of such a tactic. Familiar analogies are the Soviet "fishing
trawlers" and other vessels that attempt to shadow deployed
U. S. task forces and SSBNs.
Another possible Soviet preemptive attack tactic is
to use SLBMs or long range cruise missiles to attempt to
destroy satellite ground stations and command centers. In
the case of a ground based laser architecture, only the
power source need be targeted. Conversely, if the Soviets
believe the true U. S. goal is defense, then they may choose
to slowly degrade the defense rather than attempt a decapi-
tation attack. U. S space assets could be degraded over time
by enhanced radiation in the Van Allen belts induced by well
placed nuclear explosions. Continually impinging upon the
satellites with high power microwaves may also cause signif-
icant degradation. As the above representative set shows,
the Soviets have a broad range of options open to them, each
of which could have a serious impact on the feasibility of
BMD.
2. Satellite Defense Options
While a space based ballistic missile defense may be
severely hampered by total system ASAT tactics such as
nuclear airbursts, the defense does have a number of options
available to it to increase individual satellite surviv-
ability. However, each of these options presents a
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significant tradeoff which must be carefully weighed by the
system architect.
Any defensive architecture capable of destroying
ballistic missiles and warheads also has the inherent capa-
bility of active self defense. Each weapons platform would
be able to protect itself and other nearby management satel-
lites from rising ASAT rockets or on-orbit space mines. In
addition, each weapons satellite should be able to itself
function as an ASAT device, targeted against the Soviet ASAT
satellite platforms. The tradeoff involved in active defense
is the amount of energy used for self defense versus the
amount of energy used towards system goals. The Soviets have
the attractive attack option of simply launching numerous
attacking ASAT missiles and/or space mines, real or decoy,
until the satellite's defensive capability is exhausted. The
Soviet ballistic missiles could then be launched unimpeded.
This tactic might not be cost effective for the Soviets due
competing resources. However, any degree of use of this
tactic does, at the minimum, waste precious defensive fuel,
electrical energy, or interceptor rockets and therefore
decreases overall system effectiveness.
In considering the effectiveness of space mines, it
is pertinent to realize that no object can follow another in
space without an active station keeping capability. Drag
from solar winds and residual atmosphere operates differ-
ently on different sized and shaped objects. Therefore,
without the ability to maneuver, the space mine and its
quarry could drift beyond lethal range in a matter of a few
orbits. Thus a space mine would not be a simple remote
controlled bomb but rather a large sophisticated device
whose presence would be known to the defense almost
immediately.
Since space mines cannot be hidden from the defense,
the threat posed by the devices could possibly be addressed
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politically through the negotiation of "rules of the road"
for satellites. The United States could establish and
enforce a survivable "keep out" zone around each of its
satellites through which no foreign spacecraft could transit
without prior arrangements. Any digression would result in
the transiting satellite being immediately destroyed. This
tactic could be considered to be dynamic hardening of the
system.
While the tactic of space denial would be effective
against space mines and KEW ASAT devices of limited lethal
range, DEW ASAT satellites could not be similarly addressed.
Due their long lethal range, the "keep out" zone against
DEWs would have to be thousands of miles in diameter and,
therefore, the U. S. would literally need the ability to
totally dominate space. Since the domination of space is not
militarily or politically feasible and since DEW ASATs could
cause significant damage before an active self defense could
be utilized, other passive survivability measures must also
be considered. Passive defense of satellite (DSAT) measures
include redundancy, concealment, evasion, and hardening.
The availability of spares, both satellite and
ground station, is necessary to insure system reliability
when faced with direct attack and the requirement of
continual system operations. A large number of spares would
also force the offense to spend a great deal of effort to
preempt the system. The level of redundancy required is a
decision of the system designer that seriously effects
overall system cost effectiveness.
Satellite concealment can be affected in a number of
ways. The signature of the satellite can be made deceptive
to enemy sensors through a combination of electronic,
infrared, and stealth techniques. In the case of DEWs, the
platforms could be placed in high, remote orbits where they
would be difficult to locate. Perhaps the most effective
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concealment technique would be the use of satellite decoys.
Presenting a large number of target satellites, real and
decoy, would force the attacker to either develop a means of
effective discrimination or to shift from a preferential to
a nonpreferential mode of attack with the resulting loss of
leverage. These decoys, however, may be prohibitively costly
since not only must they be lifted into orbit but they must
also be sufficiently sophisticated to fool the defense.
If a satellite cannot be effectively concealed from
attack, then it must either maneuver to evade the attack or
meet the attack with self defense and hardening. Satellite
maneuvering could be instituted via either ground command or
by command of the satellite's own threat sensors. The
ability of the satellite to maneuver is constrained,
however, by both the amount of fuel and the amount of time
available to it. These constraints provide some leverage to
the offense. The time constraint shows that maneuvering is
not a valid option against DEWs. With kinetic energy or
nuclear kill mechanisms, the offense has the attractive
option of deploying an array of mines or missiles, real or
decoy, about the target satellite which would severely
restrict its ability to maneuver away due fuel limitations.
This ASAT option would require the defensive satellite to be
able to rapidly discriminate the threat objects and change
its direction of thrust. The option may also be able to
force the defensive satellite away from its required
coverage area.
The final passive option is satellite hardening.
Current satellites are thought to be hardened to about
1 Joule/cm 2 [ Ref . 13: p. 6]. Future satellites can be made
much harder by a variety of mechanisms and technologies. The
internal components can be easily shielded from KEWs and
continuous wave DEWs by armor plating and from pulsed DEWs
by multilayer shock coatings with no penalties in weapons
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effectiveness. The tradeoff exists in the weight of the
shielding material— the more armor placed on the satellite,
the larger the cost of lifting the satellite into orbit and
the more fuel required to maneuver.
The external components, such as sensors, communica-
tions antennas, and mirrors, are more difficult to harden.
Concepts being considered include disposable optics and
mirrors, meteor shielding against impact attacks, and window
shades against IR blinding. The problem in protecting the
external components is that the system cannot do its job if
it is sealed up. Alternative concepts which may allow
continuous operations are therefore also being studied.
Hardened RF filters may suffice if the wavelength being
protected against is known. Photochromatic optical shields,
similar to the flash shields worn by pilots, may also be
useful; however, since this technology absorbs light energy,
it possibly also may be blinded or burned through by large
power levels [ Ref . 14: p. 183].
The defensive satellites may have to use a combina-
tion of all the above options to insure survivability. A
possible decision rule for deciding between self defense,
maneuvering, and hardening is to use that option which
expends the least mass. For example, if a satellite is faced
with a decoyed KE attack, the satellite should maneuver out
of the way if the expected mass loss in propellant fuel is
minimized. If not, the satellite should either button up and
ride through (expend hardening mass) or attempt to shoot its
way through (expend weapons mass) [Ref. 13: p. 10]. In
conclusion, while an ASAT attack may possibly be countered
by a combination of tactics and technologies, the surviv-
ability of the defense satellites is a primary issue which
provides much of the uncertainty as to the ultimate effec-
tiveness and cost of space based BMD.
84
B. OFFENSIVE PROLIFERATION
If the Soviets find they cannot preemptively destroy a
space based BMD, their next logical step is to attempt to
overwhelm or circumvent the defense through a buildup of
strategic delivery systems. This action would be counter to
the stated SDI goal of reducing the nuclear threat.
A space based defense which cannot penetrate the earth's
atmosphere can be circumvented by strategic delivery systems
flying within the atmosphere. These underflying systems
include bomber aircraft, cruise missiles, and whatever other
novel methods time and ingenuity bring forth. This tactic
provides both positive and negative tradeoffs to the
defense. Although the pace of conflict would become much
slower, significant increases to current AAW defenses would
be required. Also of concern is that the number of prolifer-
ated cruise missiles actually deployed would be difficult to
verify.
Another method of underflying the defense is to use
SLBMs in depressed, low angle trajectories. While these
missiles would still be vulnerable to a satellite BMD, the
window of vulnerability would be much reduced and the multi-
phasing effectiveness would be lessened. The validity of
this countermeasure would depend on the threat rate provided
by the SLBMs. Note that a defensive satellite constellation
properly sized for the instantaneous launch of numerous
multiwarhead ICBMs should also be able to effectively
address a smaller scale, sporadic SLBM launch unless the
window of vulnerability were significantly reduced and/or
the number of launch platforms significantly increased. An
additional concern brought by this tactic is that the
reduced targeting accuracy of SLBMs may force the opponents
into the modes of area attack and area defense with the
resultant shift in leverage.
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The Soviet Union may alternatively attempt to overwhelm
the defense through sheer force by proliferating their
offensive ballistic missile levels. By inundating the
defense, the attacker would hope to either exhaust the
defense of its available destructive power or to exceed the
defense's maximum kill rate. In order to overwhelm the
defense, however, the offense would need specific knowledge
of the defense's capabilities and limitations. For example,
the offense would need to determine how many "shots" the
defense was capable of. This determination may prove diffi-
cult in the case of DEWs. Further, proliferation against a
defense with a large number of shots may not be cost
effective
The offense can increase its threat rate by prolifer-
ating in three different ways--by increasing the number of
boosters, by increasing the number of warheads per booster,
or by utilizing decoys. Intuitively, increasing the number
of MIRVs per booster does not appear feasible since this
tactic would increase the leverage of boost phase intercep-
tion. Increasing the number of boosters appears more
feasible; however, significant cost tradeoffs arise with
this tactic.
The United States could effectively meet the countermea-
sure of booster proliferation by simply increasing the
number of satellites in the boost phase defensive constella-
tion. The sensitivity of the number of boosters (M) in equa-
tion 4. 8 shows that the number of satellites required goes
up in proportion to the square root of the number of
missiles. Therefore, large increase in the booster threat
rate can be offset by significantly lesser deployments in
defensive platforms. Viewing the tradeoff numerically,
reconsider the previous example on the number of defensive
laser platforms required :
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(a) Assume that the U.S. has a boost phase defensive tier of
118 satellites at 90% tier effectiveness and that the
Soviets have 1400 ICBMs as an initial state. Therefore,
1400 (.9) = 140 boosters would survive this tier.
(b) Suppose the Soviets want to reestablish a pre-BMD opera-
tional scenario for the boost phase ( i. e. 1400 boosters are
to be delivered to the post-boost phase). The Soviets would
now need 1400 / ( 1 - .9 ) = 14000 ICBMs and, therefore,
would need to build 14000 - 1400 = 12600 new ICBM missiles
and silos. The driving result is that, to achieve their
goal, the Soviets would have to increase their current force
level by a factor of 14000 / 1400 = 10.
(c) According to the square root rule, the United States
would have to increase their number of boost phase satel-
lites by a factor of SQRT(10) = 3.16 in order to meet the
increased threat. Therefore, 118 (3.16) = 374 boost phase
satellites would now be needed causing the U. S. to build an
additional 374 - 118 = 256 new satellites.
(d) These results will be favorable to the defense if each
of the satellites costs less than 12600 / 256 = 50 times the
life cycle costs of an additional ICBM. With numbers like
this, the cost tradeoffs would likely favor the defense over
the offense.
The final proliferation method available to the Soviets
for increasing the target threat rate is to proliferate
decoys and other penetration aids. Decoying can be an effec-
tive countermeasure simply due the uncertainty the measure
brings into the conflict. Additionally, the use of this
tactic stresses a defensive system in a number of ways. For
example, besides requiring a method and sufficient power to
discriminate the targets, each credible decoy requires
birth-to-death tracking which may significantly stress
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computer battle management. The tradeoff, therefore, is that
the usefulness of a decoy to the offense depends on the cost
to the defense to either discriminate or destroy it.
Discrimination is difficult within the boost phase. All
boost phase interception schemes have a weakness in that any
object that behaves like a booster must be intercepted. Due
the potential loss of leverage, the defense simply cannot
wait until the boost phase is completed to decide which
boosters were fakes. As a result, the offense has an attrac-
tive option in launching decoy booster rockets. In an
attempt to exhaust the defense, the Soviets could construct
a massive number of cheap, unhardened silos and a new gener-
ation of fake ICBMs, consisting of boosters without costly
warheads or precision guidance packages and with no require-
ment for high reliability. While the cost of this endeavor
would be significant to both the offense and defense, the
offense would enjoy a significant reduction in boost phase
leverage.
Within the post-boost and midcourse phases, many
different options become available to both the offense and
the defense. The offense may choose any of a number of
penaid techniques and technologies. A familiar technique
would be the use of chaff in order to provide false radar
returns. A similar technique would be the use of IR
reflecting aerosol clouds to confuse thermal sensors. An
approach which would address radar, infrared, and optical
sensors simultaneously would be the use of lightweight
balloon decoys. The "balloons" could be made of a thin,
metallic skin which would provide the same signature to the
sensors as an actual reentry vehicle. Due their light
weight, a large number of these balloons could be placed in
the bus with little weight penalty. The balloons would be
simultaneously deployed along with the reentry vehicles and,
in the extreme vacuum at midcourse altitudes, would retain a
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trajectory similar to the heavier RVs. With a sophisticated
staging technique, the balloons could possibly even enshroud
a warhead in a form of antisimulation against discrimina-
tion. Another possible option is to develop RVs and penaids
with a large variety of signatures to further confuse the
defense. Regardless of the method used, the offense must
insure the penaids are credible enough to prevent defensive
discrimination via simple passive means.
The development and deployment of credible decoys forces
the defense to develop efficient methods of active target
discrimination. Without good active discrimination,
midcourse defense would become nonpreferential with the
resultant loss in defensive leverage. The most efficient
tactic of discrimination would be to not allow the decoys to
be deployed at all. By irridating the buses during post-
boost with moderate levels of laser energy, it may be
possible to either negate the buses' ability to release the
decoys or to destroy the decoys as they are released.
Should the defense not be able to stop the deployment of
the decoys, the large midcourse threat cloud would have to
be disturbed in some fashion to find the true RVs. One
possible method would be to detonate a nuclear blast in
front of the threat cloud to sweep away the lighter decoys.
This seemingly effective method of bulk filtering does,
however, present some tradeoffs to the defense. A high mega-
tonnage nuclear blast in midcourse may cause collateral
effects which would interfere with defensive functions. For
example, besides possible damage to the midcourse defensive
satellites, the IR sensors could be flooded possibly seri-
ously degrading their ability for a period of time.
Alternatively, by actively interrogating individual
threat objects, the defense could adopt a simple "shoot-
look" tactic for discrimination which would utilize the very
technologies being developed for RV kill. Continuous wave
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lasers could be used to heat credible objects so the objects-
could be discriminated by IR sensors based on thermal mass.
Pulsed lasers could impart enough force on a lightweight
object to cause it to recoil. The change in velocity could
then be measured via RF or optical sensors thereby discrimi-
nating the light decoys from the heavier reentry vehicles.
The reader should note however that, since each object must
be interrogated, this tactic causes a return to nonpreferen-
tial midcourse defense, although with a much lesser power
requirement than if trying to individually destroy each
target object.
The above discussion indicates that the credibility of
the offensive penaids would depend on rather specific knowl-
edge of the defense's discrimination tactics and technolo-
gies. In addition, while penaids may be developed to defeat
any one sensor or tactic, to be credible to a defense using
a variety of active and passive tactics and technologies the
penaids would likely have to be nearly as heavy or sophisti-
cated as an actual warhead. Therefore, the essence of the
tradeoff in decoying is that the more efficient the defen-
sive discrimination, the greater the cost to the offense to
provide credible decoys. This tradeoff shows that, in the
face of efficient discrimination, the offense would have no
military or economic incentive to proliferate decoys and,
thus, efficient discrimination provides great leverage to
the defense. In conclusion, the cost of discrimination
versus the cost of decoying is one of the primary cost
effectiveness ratios driving the ultimate feasibility of
BMD.
C. DEFENSE DEGRADATION
In addition to the aforementioned large scale measures
of preemptive attack and offensive proliferation, a great
variety of smaller scale countermeasures have been suggested
throughout the open literature. These proposed
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countermeasures range from the ridiculous to the savvy and
from the simple to the technically sophisticated. Two major
groupings are evidenced—changes in strategy and changes in
technology. A small sampling of the proposed responses
should make an impression on the decision maker as to the
vast number of different options available to the Soviets in
response to a BMD effort.
1. Changes in Launch Strategy
A number of countermeasures become available to the
Soviets through changes in their missile launch strategy.
The changes would be in either the geographic distribution
of the missiles or in the timing of the attack. Possible
strategy changes are of great importance to system designers
since any change generates great uncertainty and significant
tradeoffs in the feasibility of the defensive effort.
The vast majority of Soviet ICBM missile silos are
currently spread across the breadth of the Soviet homeland
in the vicinity of the Trans-Siberian railway ( approximately
55° N latitude). This situation allowed the previous model
assumption of uniform missile basing to which the results
are very sensitive. The model's sensitivity to the
geographic basing provides the Soviets with the attractive
strategy option of single point basing. Since the number of
satellites required for effective satellite coverage (based
on kill rate) increases if all silos are concentrated in one
geographic region and decreases if the silos are spread over
wide land areas, a strategy of single point basing provides
good numerical leverage to the offense.
While point launching is mathematically best for the
offense, significant offensive penalties arise from the use
of this tactic. Economically, a Soviet decision to abandon
their present launch configuration would require a tremen-
dous outlay of funds to build thousands of new silos and
command centers. Militarily, point launch greatly increases
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the vulnerability of the missiles. Clustered launchings
would provide the defense with a bunched threat cloud,
thereby allowing for faster retargeting and an increased
kill rate. Clustered basing may also allow the defense to
prevent the missiles from being launched at all. By deto-
nating nuclear weapons above the silo field, the defense may
perform a "nuclear pindown" whereby the missiles would be
trapped in their silos. Strategically, single point basing
is a readily verifiable configuration which negates the
offensive element of surprise. Of final note, the use of
this tactic addresses the boost phase in isolation and may
ease defensive stress in later tiers.
Another strategic launch countermeasure is to adjust
the attack sequence. The timing of the attack, whether via a
point basing or spread basing scheme, may prove to be the
driving factor in offensive effectiveness. Since highly
structured, salvo launches are less effective against a
multitiered defensive system, the offense may choose to
rapidly, perhaps instantaneously, launch all its missiles in
the hope of punching a hole in the defense. This tactic is
not, however, without significant tradeoffs. In addition to
a bunched threat cloud, simultaneous launch could negate the
capability of structured RV arrivals which are necessary to
attack the defense in the terminal phase. With some previous
knowledge of the defense's capabilities, the offense could
conduct specially orchestrated launchings that would force a
nonorderly retargeting of a defensive weapon over its entire
coverage area. The attack sequencing would also depend on
the type of defensive weapon used. For example, an Xray
pumped laser cannot target missiles one at a time; there-
fore, a phased launch sequence could be used to force the
defense to decide when to fire most effectively. Before this
decision is made, a large number of missiles could get
through the boost phase defense.
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The above discussion addresses the extremes of the
strategic launch options. Other lesser options should also
be studied by the system designer. As an example, perhaps
single point basing would be not used but rather a small
number of silo clusters spread over a wide geographic area.
Mobile ICBM launchers may also be considered by the Soviets.
However, since global boost phase defenses do not critically
depend on prior knowledge of a launcher's position, the
distinction between mobile and fixed launchers may not be a
factor. Considering attack timing, the weather state may be
critical. Clouds, fog, or thick haze may reduce the effi-
ciency of early warning satellites and target sensors.
Numerous other strategic launch factors and options could be
further identified. In view of this, it becomes obvious that
a ballistic missile defense must be designed and sized to
address a large range of strategic launch options specifi-
cally utilized to fully stress the system.
2. Changes in Boost and Post-Boost Phase Tactics and
Technology
Due the great defensive leverage associated with
boost and post-boost interception, it is reasonable that the
Soviets would devote most of their efforts in developing
countermeasures for these phases. The possible Soviet
response to boost phase interception that has received the
most attention in the open press is the "fast burn" booster.
SDI critics have suggested that, should the Soviets develop
a solid fueled rocket that could complete boosting while
still within the atmosphere, then the potential for advanta-
geous boost phase interception would be seriously dimin-
ished. Fast burn rockets would at the minimum compress the
window of vulnerability thereby increasing the number of
defensive satellites required and could possibly completely
close the window to certain technologies such as neutral
particle beams and popup Xray lasers.
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While this change in technology appears devastating
to any BMD effort that relies on boost phase interception,
significant deployment tradeoffs arise from the use of this
tactic. The critical issue is not how fast the booster burns
but rather when the warheads are deployed. Since a high
level of warhead placement accuracy is required for surgical
attacks against hard point targets, there exists a limit on
how low the warheads can be deployed after boosting is
completed. Atmospheric density at lower altitudes can
significantly degrade reentry vehicle trajectory and final
warhead accuracy. Therefore, for the same reason why DEWs
cannot target the booster, the bus must wait until it is
vulnerable in the upper atmosphere to precisely deploy its
warheads.
In addition to reduced warhead accuracy, other
deployment tradeoffs arise. The bus cannot deploy any light-
weight decoys until it has left the atmosphere; otherwise,
the penaids would be readily discriminated due atmospheric
drag. Significant weight penalties are also associated with
fast burn boosters. The rockets must be strengthened against
acceleration and shielded against the increased friction
heat; therefore, the missile has less payload available for
warheads and penaids. Since this countermeasure tactic
addresses only the boost and post-boost phases and may
possibly degrade the offense's capabilities against later
stages, the effectiveness of fast burn boosters is
questionable.
The offense may further attempt to counter boost
phase interception by screening the missiles from the space
based defense. A variety of screens against different defen-
sive technologies can be established by simply detonating a
nuclear weapon in the upper atmosphere. Since such an action
would greatly and unpredictably disturb the geomagnetic
field, charged particle beam weapons would be rendered
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useless. Neutral particle beam weapons would be negated by
the principle of "atmospheric heave". A small nuclear
warhead exploded at the upper edge of the atmosphere would
lift and place a thin layer of air over the rising missiles
and into the path of the neutral beam, converting it into a
charged beam and thereby causing it to disperse [ Ref . 15].
Further, this atmospheric layer would not be dense enough to
prevent the deployment of warheads or penaids. Infrared
target acquisition sensors can be hindered by developing a
strong IR background in the atmosphere just prior to missile
launch so the rising missiles would be difficult to find.
The utility of creating such an IR background by precursor
nuclear burst may, however, be lessened by using sensors
that look for a particular wavelength.
Various warhead deployment tactics have been
proposed as potential Soviet countermeasures against the
post-boost phase. At the beginning of the phase, the reentry
vehicle bus could be broken down into several microbuses,
each carrying several RVs and a number of penaids. This
tactic would provide more targets to the defense, would
lessen the leverage of early post-boost intercept, and would
shorten the time required to deploy the RVs and penaids. An
alternative proposal would be to simply eliminate the post-
boost phase through the near simultaneous deployment of all
RVs and penaids. By combining this tactic with simultaneous
launch, the offense could easily overwhelm a defense sized
on threat rate. However, simultaneous release may not be
economically feasible to the offense. In order to perform
multiple warhead targeting, the current technology bus is
simply a small rocket which maneuvers to place each warhead
and the various penaids in slightly different trajectories.
If, under current technology, all the warheads were released
simultaneously, the ability for multiple targeting would be
lost. Therefore, to regain the leverage of multiple
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targeting under the tactic of simultaneous launch, each
warhead and penaid would require its own sophisticated
thrust and guidance system. As a result, this tactic would
require a substantial increase in missile payload and would
cause the penaids to be nearly as sophisticated as the
reentry vehicles; thus, this tactic may prove to be economi-
cally infeasible.
The offense could attempt to prevent boost and post-
boost phase interception by simply hardening the rocket and
bus and/or shielding the critical components. The reentry
vehicles themselves are already significantly hardened to
withstand atmospheric reentry. However, in reality, current
technology missiles are probably hardened to less than
1 kJ/cm 2 rather than the 20 kJ/cm 2 previously assumed in the
model [ Ref . 5: p. 11] .
One method of hardening the missile against lasers
is to coat the upper rocket stages with an ablative
material, such as carbon or silica phenolic. Ablative
materials provide a heat shield around the missile which,
when heated by laser illumination, burns off carrying away
most of the incident laser energy in the combustion gases
rather than conducting the energy through to the missile
skin. The use of ablative materials would significantly
increase the lethal power fluence required to kill the
missile; however, the use of ablative materials would also
significantly increase the launch weight of the missile and
therefore decrease the payload available.
Another technological countermeasure against pulsed
lasers would be to use crushable multilayer missile coat-
ings. These layers would capture the impulse wave and stop
it from reaching the booster wall. Both of the above hard-
ening countermeasures can be negated by the defense through
the use of tailored laser beams. By initially using short
laser pulses to burn off the ablative shield or crush
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through the multilayer coatings, a continuous wave beam
could then be used against the missile skin. Tailored laser
beams require the defensive ability to rapidly shift and
tune the laser wavelength. This capability may be available
in free electron laser technologies.
Neutral particle beam and microwave weapons could be
addressed by placing lead shielding around the missile's
control electronics. However, since only extremely thick
shields would offer any protection, this countermeasure may
be economically infeasible. Studies have shown that the lead
shield must be at least 1. 5 inches thick to offer any
protection and therefore the shielding could weigh many tons
[Ref. 16].
The offense can dynamically harden the missiles
against laser weapons by either reflecting the laser energy
away from the missile or by spreading the energy across the
missile thereby reducing spot fluence. A missile can be
greatly hardened by applying a highly reflective, mirrored
coating to its exterior. This measure may not, however, be
as simplistic as it seems. Since the surface would become
dull due abrasion during the boost ascent, the Soviets could
not be certain of the measure's effectiveness. A possible
method of solving this deployment problem is to keep the
reflective coating covered by a strippable outer wrapper
until the booster leaves the lower atmosphere [Ref. 12].
By rotating the missile in flight, the laser energy
could be spread more evenly across the missile's surface. A
roll of one revolution per second would increase the
missile's hardness by approximately a factor of three.
Although this tactic would require a large increase in laser
power by the defense, several offensive penalties raise.
Spinning the missile may seriously complicate the tasks of
missile guidance and RV deployment and may require a large
degree of missile redesign. Additionally, this tactic would
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not be effective against pulsed DEWs and may also not be
effective against other DEWs. Due the short kill time
required, a slowly revolving missile could be negated be a
defensive laser "hot spot" tracking capability.
Other dynamic hardening methods rely on existing
devices that can determine whether a target is being illumi-
nated by a laser beam and can spot the direction from which
the laser is coming [ Ref . 14: p. 182]. An exotic proposal
based on this capability is to use a movable, heat absorbing
ring which would slide up and down the missile in order to
protect the "hot spot". Note, however, that this proposal
would require major renovations to the missile and a new
series of flight tests. Another proposal would be to develop
advanced hydraulic heat exchangers which could be used to
distribute the thermal load at the command of the sensor.
Both of these proposals would be effective against a DEW
technology requiring dwell on target but both would be inef-
fective against impulse kill.
3. Changes in Midcourse and Terminal Phase Tactics and
Technology
Once the offense has successfully launched and
deployed all their reentry vehicles and penaids, the domi-
nant defensive problem becomes target location and tracking.
The Soviets again have a number of tactical and techno-
logical options available to them to compound this problem.
An option currently available to the offense is the use of
low observable designs and anti-radar coatings in order to
make the RVs harder to spot. The tradeoff involved with this
tactic is that the new stealth materials typically absorb
more light energy than current warhead coverings and there-
fore the warheads would become more vulnerable to attack.
The offense may choose to complicate the midcourse
phase by using varied flight profiles such as non-standard
trajectories or non-predictable trajectories. In addition,
the offense may desire to maneuver the RVs and penaids to
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confuse trackers that depend on precision ballistic trajec-
tories. These actions are not likely to be either economi-
cally or strategically feasible for a number of reasons. To
precisely maneuver in space would require each RV and penaid
to have complex thrusting and guidance systems which may
prohibitively add to the system cost. Thrusting the reentry
vehicles would also enhance the target's IR signature. Once
located, the RV would not be able to maneuver to avoid a
directed energy hit due the short kill times associated with
DEWs. Further, since a ballistic missile is a very rigid
offensive system which must travel in a narrow attack
corridor to maintain warhead accuracy, both maneuvering and
randomizing trajectories may be strategically infeasible
after the boost phase.
Within the terminal phase, the offense loses the
leverage associated with lightweight decoys and penaids. To
recoup some of this leverage, the Soviets must find some
means of placing stress on the terminal defense. By
exploding a precursor nuclear warhead over the defense, the
offense can attempt to neutralize the defense through radar
blackout. However, due the uncertainty as to the effective-
ness of the burst in producing radar blackout, the Soviets
could not confidently plan an attack depending solely on
this effort.
A technological countermeasure which would greatly
stress the terminal defense would be the use of maneuverable
reentry vehicles (MARVs). A reentry vehicle can be made
maneuverable by deploying pop-out control surfaces and
tilting its body thereby generating lift. MARVs could alter
their course upon atmospheric reentry and attack prepro-
grammed targets tens to hundreds of kilometers away from
their original destination; therefore, MARVs would seriously
complicate defensive targeting [ Ref . 6: p. 20] . Another
technological countermeasure would be the tactic of salvage
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fusing. By causing the warhead to detonate once interception
is attempted, the IR environment of the upper atmosphere
could be substantially flooded thereby degrading the capa-
bility of the target sensors. Further, salvage fusing could
cause collateral damage to other defensive assets such as
rising interceptor rockets.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this study of the technologies of and coun-
termeasures to ballistic missile defense, a number of
salient points became apparent. Each of these points is
critical to the ultimate feasibility of a defensive effort :
(1) that the magnitude of the effort will depend on a
well defined goal which has yet to be determined.
Should the goal be modest, such as merely reducing
the number of warheads that impact near population
centers, then perhaps more traditional terminal
defense methods might suffice. Further, if the goal
is to insure a capability for retaliation, then
defenses may not be necessary at all since a launch
on warning policy would achieve this goal.
(2) that, while the wisdom of developing and deploying a
less than perfect defense remains controversial. an
imperfect defense may establish a threshold of
attack intensity. below which the Soviets would not
attack due the level of success uncertainty. This
concept would itself be a form of nuclear deterrence;
therefore, a defense need not be perfect to provide
stabilization.
(3) that the most likely Soviet response to a BMD deploy-
ment would be a proliferation of forces, both nuclear
and conventional and including ASAT and other count-
ering techniques. Although the U. S. seems to enjoy
significant cost leverage over the Soviets in the
proliferation of ballistic missiles, the Soviets do
not have to meet the same cost effectiveness criteria
in their economy as does the U. S.
(4) that to realize the protection of a space based BMD,
the United States must also increase their AAW
defense capabilities and conventional force levels.
This factor will have significant impact on the final
cost of changing to a defensive posture.
Additionally, without a superpower agreement on the
resultant levels of conventional weapons, the deploy-
ment of a BMD would greatly increase the risk of
conventional war.
(5) that the long transition period from a U.S. offensive
to defensive posture will be uneasy. Further, during
this period, the likelihood of nuclear war may be at
its peak.
(6) that, in the long run, a likely Soviet response would
be to deploy a matching BMD. The deployment of defen-
sive systems by both sides would cause uncertainties
as to the effectiveness of either side's retaliatory
capability. These uncertainties could provide pres-
sure for a preemptive strike during crises.
(7) that a complex, space based BMD would require posi-
tive control of its operations. The short timelines
involved in a ballistic nuclear exchange and the time
sensitivity of the defense may require the system to
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be capable of totally automated release. The polit-
ical feasibility of initiating a defense without
human interface is highly uncertain. Nonetheless,
the defensive system must be sensitive enough so that
it is instantaneously available yet under control to
such a degree that it is safe from accident when not
needed.
(8) that the defense must have a demonstrated reli-
ability. If the defense is to be an effective deter-
rent to nuclear war, the system must be credible to
the Soviets. Therefore, the defensive system must be
physically tested to show that it is reliable and
effective.
(9) that satellite survivability is a key issue to spacebased BMD. The defense need not be invulnerable but
must be able to maintain a high level of effective-
ness when directly attacked.
(10) that the Soviets can seriously complicate the U.S.
effort by developing a large variety of countermea-
sure technologies and tactics.
This study showed that the Soviets have a vast range of
countermeasures available to them. These countermeasures may
not only be cheaper but could also use simple, current tech-
nologies vice the complex, future technologies required for
BMD. Additionally, the use of countermeasures would lead to
a greater asymmetry of forces between superpowers. However,
this is not to say that the U. S. should not consider a tech-
nology simply because it has a countermeasure but rather
that the U. S. must be aware of what countering options are
available to the Soviets for any particular technology. In
the least, this knowledge reduces the uncertainties in
system research and may possibly allow the U. S. to develop
counter-countermeasures to achieve a technological defensive
superiority. Towards these ends, the U. S. must continue to
identify and study the impact of potential Soviet
countermeasures.
In summary, the ultimate utility and cost effectiveness
of any proposed ballistic missile defense will depend on the
defensive goal, the character of the system, the nature of
the attack, and the degree of system effectiveness required.
Until these factors are clearly defined and quantified, it
would be illogical to renounce the ABM Treaty and SALT
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